AN

APPEAL

TO

JUSTICE AND TRUE LIBERTY;

OR,

AN ACCURATE STATEMENT

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH

TOWARDS THE

REPUBLIC OF GENEVA.

Du Roveray (J.A.) K

LONDON:

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MDCCXCIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD VISCOUNT SYDNEY,

ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL, &c.

My Lord,

This Appeal, in favour of an oppreſſed but eſtimable people, cannot appear under a more proper patronage than that of a known friend to juſtice, to true freedom, and to thoſe amiable domeſtic virtues, by which that people has ever been diſtinguiſhed.

Such were the motives which made me preſume to requeſt Your Lordship's acceptance of this homage.

At the ſame time, MY LORD, allow me to expreſs the pleaſure I feel in having this opportunity to profeſs publicly the deep ſenſe I entertain of YOUR LORDSHIP'S kindneſs and benevolence to me, and the reſpect with which I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP'S

moſt obedient humble ſervant

EARL'S COURT,
April 22, 1793.

J. A. Du Roveray.

INTRODUCTION.

AS ſoon as the attack of the French on Geneva had been taken notice of in the Britiſh Parliament, the author of the preſent ſheets thought himſelf bound, both in duty to his own native country, and in gratitude to thoſe reſpectable characters who had ſhewn ſo much concern for its fate, to publiſh a ſtatement of facts, which through the French newſpapers were yet but imperfectly known.

This undertaking, which, as he at firſt had conceived, would have been confined to a few pages, has inſenſibly grown to a greater extent, through the variety of incidents which have followed the firſt hoſtilities of the French, ſo that it was only ready for the preſs in February laſt. The neceſſity of aſcertaining many facts, which, from that period

period had ſucceſſively come to the author's knowledge, by private correſpondence, part of which has been inſerted in the notes, has, till now, unavoidably retarded its publication.

Such as it is, the author is ſenſible that at the preſent momentous criſis of affairs on the Continent, this work muſt appear in different lights, according to the diſpoſition of its readers. To ſuch as form their judgment on political matters, from commercial or geographical conſiderations only, the concerns of a ſmall inland State, which can neither affect the Trade of Great Britain, nor be affected by her Navy, will be rather unimportant.—To thoſe who are fond of diving into the bottom of political queſtions, the proceedings of the French, in regard to independent States, however ſmall, as far as they are an immediate conſequence of their avowed principles, and of their actual form of conſtitution, will not appear unworthy of notice.—To the humane and ſenſible,

ſible, to thoſe who know Geneva, and have ſpent ſome time of their youth amongſt its citizens, ſome degree of happineſs muſt be derived from the ſight of that *little ſeminary of virtue* (as it has been ſo juſtly called) defending its laws, its morals, its Helvetic connections, not only againſt the military power of France, but againſt the contagion of their principles, propagated amongſt them by the fouleſt Jacobine artifices, ſubmitting, apparently for a while to their tenets, in order to ſave its independence; preſerving an habitual order in the midſt of viſible anarchy; continually reſiſting the convulſive fits of a levelling ſyſtem with patience, moderation, and compoſure; and ready to diſplay, at the re-eſtabliſhment of legal order, thoſe ſame temperate virtues, from which alone may be expected, in ſuch a ſmall community, the return of true concord and of former happineſs.

Theſe conſiderations are the only plea the author can urge to obtain the reader's indul-

indulgence towards thoſe many defects, unavoidably attending the performance of one, who, being born on the Continent, and having ſpent but a few years in theſe Iſlands, preſumes to addreſs the public in a language, foreign to him, although ſo rich and expreſſive as the Engliſh.

AN

APPEAL

TO

JUSTICE AND TRUE LIBERTY,

&c. &c.

IN the midſt of the dangers and numberleſs miſeries which have lately involved the Republic of Geneva, its citizens have unremittingly exerted every means which prudence, reaſon, and juſtice could afford, or ſuggeſt to them, to preſerve the bleſſings of internal tranquillity and liberty, and of their independence, ſo dear to every free ſtate, from the various and long meditated ſchemes of their ill-deſigning and powerful oppreſſors.

Reduced as they are to a defenceleſs ſtate, and being from their ſituation an eaſy prey to the attacks of unreſtrained ambition; threatened, moreover, with total and immediate ruin if they

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any longer reſiſted the wiſhes of an inconſiderable faction, which the intrigues of the Jacobins have fomented and created amongſt them, they felt the neceſſity of reſigning themſelves to their fate; and ſeeing omnipotent force every where arbitrarily deciding the queſtion of right, they were almoſt led to conclude, that juſtice was at laſt openly renounced amongſt men. But there is a country where the voice of truth and reaſon is ſtill heard, a nation at all times diſtinguiſhed for its good faith and generoſity, and whoſe government has ever held treaties to be ſacred and inviolable. Senſible of the invaluable bleſſing of its own independence, it has conſtantly reſpected that of other nations. In the eyes of ſuch a government, the rights of a ſmall ſtate are as reſpectable as thoſe of the moſt powerful. The facility of oppreſſion has never ſanctioned the ſecret projects of aggrandizement, nor have the diſgraceful motives of revenge or retaliation, when even the plaineſt occaſion offered, ever diverted it from the ſtrict rules of national faith and impartial juſtice. To ſuch a nation, and to ſuch a government, the conduct of the enemies of Geneva cannot fail to appear in its true light. This has already been manifeſted by the

honourable

honourable marks of intereſt given to Geneva by the Engliſh Government, through the King's Miniſter in Switzerland, together with the repeated and unanſwered teſtimonies, which members of both Houſes of the Britiſh Parliament, as eminent for their talents as for their rank and office, have borne in favour of that little but reſpectable Republic.

The information, however, which has been hitherto received in this country reſpecting theſe tranſactions, has been very imperfect, and although there is reaſon to believe that the world has had ſufficient proofs, through the public channels of intelligence, of the diſhonourable conduct of the French towards Geneva, yet if the particulars of the low arts of treachery, of the repeated breaches of ſolemn faith, and violation of the rights of neutral nations, of the ſhameleſs and inſidious pretexts employed to ſcreen their premeditated plots of ſubverſion and anarchy, if all theſe were known, and if at the ſame time it were known how unmerited and unprovoked have been theſe enormities and hoſtilities on the part of France, ſuch a recital of facts could not but intereſt every honeſt man, in the wiſh of ſeeing ſuch an odious and unparalleled oppreſ-

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ſion checked in its object, and the rights of juſtice, of liberty and public order, finally reſtored and preſerved from any future infringement.

GENEVA, from her inſignificancy, could never have given the French any cauſe of uneaſineſs, whereas her morals, her principles, and her long, unweary, and temperate exertions in the cauſe of freedom, ought to have engaged their eſteem, if they felt any real regard for true liberty. Her citizens were, from the large ſums of money which they had formerly placed in the French funds, deeply intereſted in the welfare of France, and they had been naturally well-wiſhers to thoſe noble efforts which, at firſt, by checeking deſpotiſm, promiſed to that country a free, a happy, and a well-organized mixt conſtitution. Strictly attentive, as much from inclination as from intereſt, to avoid even the ſmalleſt ſubject of offence to any of the ſurrounding powers, they proved themſelves particularly ſerviceable to the neighbouring diſtricts of France. At a time when the inhabitants of thoſe diſtricts were afraid of falling a prey to thoſe parties of banditti, who had laid waſte

waſte ſeveral parts of the country with fire and ſword, they lent them thoſe very arms which lately have been turned againſt them (1). Upon ſeveral occaſions they relieved their diſtreſſes, by yielding them a portion of thoſe very proviſions which national precaution and vigilance keep always ready in Geneva, as a ſupply in caſe of want or ſcarcity (2). And in general they have never been wanting in any thing towards them, which might be expected from a good and friendly neighbourhood (3).

Independent of thoſe treaties by which the perfect neutrality of Geneva in time of war is ſecured, the general diſpoſition of the people, and a natural regard to their own ſecurity, can never fail to induce the citizens of that Republic to adhere ſtrictly to a ſyſtem of neutrality. It was in purſuance of this intention, and in order the more to enforce it, that as ſoon as the war broke out, they procured themſelves to be expreſsly included, by the Swiſs Diets of *Frawenfeld* and *Araw*, in the neutrality which the Helvetic Body declared they would for ever hold ſacred and inviolable.

From the knowledge of thoſe uncontrovertible facts, it may be aſked, how then had the malevolence

volence of France been excited againſt Geneva? how could ſuch a ſmall and inoffenſive Republic become ſo ſuddenly the object of the hatred and aggreſſion of thoſe to whoſe protection and regard they had ſuch a natural claim? how has Geneva been brought by France to the brink of this precipice?

This cannot be rightly underſtood but by tracing up facts ſomewhat higher.

It appears, that as far back as the planning of the diſtribution of France into Departments, and the firſt attempts for the re-union of Avignon, it came into the head of ſome of the French Theoretic Reformers, that Geneva, together with the neighbouring parts of Savoy and Switzerland, ought to be made a portion of that grand republican ſyſtem which they had then already conceived. The deep and general diſcontents excited in Geneva by the unwiſe and miſchievous alterations introduced into its government, in the year 1782, by a foreign military force, though ſuſpended for a moment by the partial changes made in 1789 (4), afforded thoſe men the beſt opportunity of realizing their projects, and they needed only to cheriſh thoſe diſcontents, by the hopes of a powerful and active aſſiſtance from without,

without, to create a party in Geneva, which in time could be made to co-operate with them in uniting that ſmall Republic to the French Departments.

A citizen of Geneva, then in Paris (who had been arbitrarily removed in the year 1781, from the office of Attorney General, by the order of the French Miniſter, the Count de Vergennes, and who afterwards had been as illegally exiled in 1782, by the then prevailing party, and a few months ſince recalled with the other exiles by the general voice both of the Magiſtrates and of the people), was led to ſuſpect thoſe diſhonourable views of the French political theoriſts. Struck with the danger of his country, and fully convinced that nothing but a ſincere and well-grounded union of all parties could prevent her falling into anarchy, or into the hands of the French Jacobins, he repaired to Geneva, and directly applied firſt to thoſe very men who had been the promoters of his exile, then to the other citizens; he diſcloſed to them the ſecret but neceſſary influence which the progreſs of the French revolutionary principles muſt have on the tranquillity, and on the conſtitution of all the ſurrounding countries, and particularly on the happi-

neſs and independence of Geneva, if by ſome wiſe and timely regulations, a ſtrong barrier was not early oppoſed to the ſpirit of novelty and diſorganization.—He ſtrongly inſiſted with all parties on the neceſſity of forgetting their ancient animoſities, and of generouſly coaleſcing to procure the reſtoration of freedom, and the maintenance of public peace and independence. To this end he exhorted them to make, in a quiet and regular way, ſuch proviſions as a long and dearly bought experience had proved neceſſary to the general good, and particularly to obviate the ill effects of thoſe diſtinctions of claſſes, which had been, for years paſt, a ſource of diſcord and diſſatisfaction amongſt the Geneveſe, by admitting, under certain conditions, every honeſt and unexceptionable native of the country to the rights of citizenſhip, which alone could give them an unalienable intereſt in the preſervation of liberty and good order; and to form among all ranks of Geneveſe ſuch ſtrong and habitual relations of friendſhip and reciprocal good offices, as would for ever endear to them the eſtabliſhed conſtitution, and thereby ſtifle every growing wiſh of following the example of anarchy and confuſion which they had before them. Though

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the plans of this citizen were not in every reſpect adopted, (5) his remonſtrances, powerfully countenanced by the prudent and patriotic diſpoſition of the Magiſtrates, by the good ſenſe of the people, and alſo by the exhortations of the two Cantons of Zurich and of Berne, proved ſo far effectual as to operate in Geneva, an almoſt general union of parties; and excepting ſome few perſons who are ever fond of extremes, and who on every ſide are obſtinately attached to their particular way of thinking, the generality of the citizens readily concurred with the Magiſtrates in ſaving their country from the imminent ruin which threatened it.

Thus whilſt France, occupied with her violent and tumultuous purſuits after a wild ſyſtem of liberty, was every where exhibiting ſcenes of confuſion, licentiouſneſs and anarchy, the Geneveſe, profiting by her very faults, were, in a peaceable and orderly manner, correcting the abuſes of their own conſtitution. Their Magiſtrates, ſenſible, from their own experience, of the utter impoſſibility of governing a free people without its confidence, ſpontaneouſly propoſed ſuch alterations in their ſyſtem of government as were generally thought well calculated to re-

eſtabliſh liberty on a broad foundation, without endangering the public order and tranquillity. The citizens of Geneva conſented, on their part, to admit to a full exerciſe of their political rights, in ſucceſſion and under a trifling pecuniary qualification, all ſuch natives of the Republic as till then had not, by the ancient conſtitution, enjoyed them. Theſe laws, dictated by prudence and generoſity, diſcuſſed with the utmoſt freedom, approved of in the freeſt manner, by all the Councils of the Republic, (6) were received with a ſenſe of gratitude by every well-wiſher to their country, amongſt thoſe who were ſo largely benefited by them. The manifeſt tendency of theſe new laws was to ſecure the liberties and the property of all the Geneveſe without exception, and invincibly to attach them, by the ſtrongeſt ties of ſelf-intereſt, to the preſervation both of the internal tranquillity, and of the external independence of the State.

No ſooner had this work of peace been completed, than the Jacobins in Paris began to undermine it, by thoſe cunning and wicked practices which experience has proved to be but too ſucceſsful, when employed by that reſtleſs and immoral ſect of levellers. Some few deſpicable individuals

individuals who had been reduced to deſpair, at the reſtoration of peace and good order in Geneva, were now pitched upon, and moſt baſely employed in miſleading the lower ranks of the people: ſeditious and abuſive pamphlets iſſuing from the French licentious preſſes in the neighbourhood, were daily diſſeminated in Geneva in defiance of the laws; and whilſt their profligate authors were endeavouring, with malignant induſtry, to excite diſturbances, riots, and confuſion in Geneva, they, through the channels of the French news-papers, which were open ſolely to themſelves, miſrepreſented the manly and vigorous conduct both of the Magiſtrates and of the citizens, for the maintenance of public peace and order, as the low intrigues of a dark and deſpotic ariſtocracy.

Though ſuch a wicked ſcheme proved abortive with reſpect to Geneva, where good ſenſe and reſpect for the laws have conſtantly prevailed amongſt all ranks of perſons, it had the deſired effect in a political Aſſembly, and on men in whoſe eyes the mere ſuſpicion of *Ariſtocracy* was conſidered as a national offence, which could be expiated only by thoſe ſummary and expeditious ways, ſo well adapted to their new and undigeſted form of Government.

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The conſequence of this was, that when France declared war againſt Savoy, the French General, in manifeſt breach of that treaty (7), which enſures *the neutrality of Geneva and its territory, in caſe of a rupture between the neighbouring powers*, was either inveſted with the power, or received an expreſs order to take poſſeſſion of Geneva, whenever the ſecurity or the ſucceſs of the French arms ſhould make it appear to be requiſite; it is moreover affirmed, that the General received particular directions to that purpoſe, from M. *Claviere*, one of the French Miniſters, who himſelf is a Geneveſe by birth, and who having been exiled from his country in the year 1782, is preſumed to have nouriſhed a ſtrong and perſonal hatred, and a ſpirit of revenge againſt all the ruling powers in that Republic (8). In the mean while, ſeveral Geneveſe, then in Paris, informed their countrymen of the powers with which the General was inveſted, at the ſame time alleging that the leaſt reſiſtance would involve both the City and its inhabitants in the moſt imminent danger. That Miniſter gave a ſimilar piece of advice himſelf, to M. Daſſier, formerly a Captain in the garriſon of Geneva,

Geneva, as early as the end of Auguſt, or the beginning of September laſt.

The effect of theſe reports on the Geneveſe cannot be ſo eaſily deſcribed as felt, by thoſe who recollect the events which had lately taken place at Arles, Avignon, and Paris, and who are acquainted with the unwearied love of the Geneveſe for the independence of their Republic. Scarce had they time to deliberate on the approaching ſtorm, and on the moſt proper means to protect themſelves from it, when Savoy was invaded. Terrified both at the ſuddenneſs of the conqueſt, and at the fate which threatened themſelves, they ſought thoſe ſuccours from their allies of Zurick and Berne, which they had an undoubted claim to from their treaties, and which had been conſtantly granted them in ſimilar circumſtances, whenever any foreign power, even France itſelf, occupied Savoy. The French, diſappointed by this wiſe and timely meaſure, began to complain of it through their Reſident at Geneva, as a violation of the ſecond article of the *Treaty of Neutrality annexed to the Act of Guarantee* of the laws which were impoſed on Geneva, by force of arms in 1782; by which article the

the *common conſent of the three guaranteeing powers was neceſſary to the introduction of their troops in Geneva*; but they ſoon felt that as this article related ſolely to the caſe of *an inſurrection againſt the laws of the country, which Government ſhould not be able to repreſs*, it was evidently miſapplied in a circumſtance where the moſt perfect peace and harmony ſubſiſted in the city (9).

Unable to maintain this ground, the French alleged the fifth Article of the ſame treaty, which declares *Geneva and its territory neutral, in caſe of a war among two or three of the neighbouring powers:* they repreſented a *neutral force* in a city which had declared and kept itſelf ſtrictly *neutral*, as a *breach* of that very neutrality, and as *hoſtility* to themſelves.

Had the French leaders paid any attention either to the meaning, or to the ſtrict letter of this fifth Article, they would have acknowledged that it was not more favourable to their claim than the ſecond. They would have found that the purpoſe of this Article was to lay a reſtraint, not *upon the Republic of Geneva*, which never could, without the groſſeſt abſurdity, be preſumed to make an offenſive war on her neighbours, but *upon theſe powers themſelves*, who eaſily

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may be induced, in caſe of a war amongſt them, to take advantage of any peculiar circumſtance to make themſelves maſters of ſuch an important poſt.—They would have found that, by declaring that *Geneva and its territory ſhould be reputed neutral*, this Article aimed only at preventing theſe powers from any ways *incroaching*, in caſe of a war, on *the territorial rights of the Republic*; but that it had no tendency whatever to hinder the Geneveſe from taking, in ſuch a caſe, thoſe precautions of prudence, which every *free and independent State* has a right to adopt for its preſervation, and which, beſides, were ſuggeſted to them by their *ancient and perpetual confederacy of* 1584, with the Cantons of Zurick and Bern (10). They would have ſeen too, that immediately after declaring the neutrality of Geneva, this very Article forbade any of the contracting powers to *require of the Republic any other offices than thoſe which were contained in the treaties reſerved by the act of Guarantee*; and as the *Confederacy of* 1584 was expreſsly *reſerved* by this act, they would have found that, even in caſe of a war between France and the Cantons of Zurick and Bern, where the Geneveſe had ſent theſe Cantons the ſuccours ſtipulated by that confederacy, France could

could in no reſpect complain of theſe ſuccours as an act of hoſtility, which ought to deprive the Geneveſe of the ſtipulated neutrality. If ſuch was evidently the true meaning of this Article, in a caſe where Geneva would have *furniſhed ſuccours* to one of the belligerent powers, how unjuſt, how inconſiſtent was the complaint of the French, in an occaſion where, in fact, Geneva had done nothing which would not be *perfectly conformable to the ſtricteſt neutrality*.

But, in the eyes of the French leaders, the plain and ſtriking conſequences of the very act which they had alleged in their favour, were of no avail to the deciſion of the point at iſſue; without any regard to the preciſe declarations of exiſting treaties, or to thoſe very laws eſtabliſhed in Geneva under the French Guarantee, which aſſerted the power of the ſovereign Council there to *call for the aſſiſtance of an auxiliary force* (11), or to the ſacred rights of a free and independent State (12); they imperiouſly demanded that the Swiſs troops ſhould be *expelled* from the city within three days, and that the Magiſtrates of Geneva, who, in obedience to the orders of their fellow-citizens, had applied to the Swiſs for ſuccours, ſhould be puniſhed; at the

the ſame time ſtigmatiſing them, with the epithets of *traitors to their country*, and *violators of the faith of treaties*, for having done what it was impoſſible for them to avoid, without the moſt infamous violation of their oaths, and without being guilty of the blackeſt treaſon to their fellow-citizens.

Even before this deſpotic dictate was announced by the French newſpapers, their Southern army had ſurrounded Geneva, on the ſide of Savoy, and committed ſeveral depredations, pillages, and inſults on the eſtates, the properties and the perſons of the Geneveſe. Without loſs of time they brought before Geneva a formidable train of artillery, raiſed ſeveral batteries, and with mortars, bombs, and red hot balls, threatened to reduce it to aſhes, if its citizens did not immediately obey their ſummons.

Europe ſhuddered with indignation at ſuch ferocious meaſures of unprincipled tyrants: Switzerland raiſed an army effectually to oppoſe them; and the Geneveſe, united by their very danger, and faithful to the voice of honour and virtue, determined to die rather than ſubmit (13). A ſmall number, either through fear or through perfidy, left the city at this criſis: and ſome of

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them, *turpe dictu!* ſeduced by Jacobine artifices, enliſted into the French army.

Conſcious at that time of the difficulties of their enterprize, or brought back to a ſenſe of juſtice and prudence by the manly and philanthropic diſpoſition of their own General (14), the French thought proper to cover their violence and injuſtice with deceit; and affecting an intention to convince the Geneveſe by arguments, they began criticiſing ſeveral expreſſions of the treaty of 1584, in virtue of which Geneva had requeſted the aſſiſtance of the Cantons of Zurick and Bern; and, by the moſt ſhameleſs ignorance of the firſt principles of the laws of nations, they ſought to examine whether the *Caſus fœderis* exiſted or not; as if any other power, than that which had intervened as a party in a treaty, could have any right to interpret its articles, and as if a treaty could receive a better explanation than from an invariable uſage and a long ſeries of precedents; they even went ſo far as to pretend, that as Geneva had not yet been attacked, the Swiſs troops ought not to have been demanded; as if a State were bound to wait till ſuccours could be of no avail, before it called for them.

But the French, ſenſible of the weakneſs of thoſe arguments, ſoon changed again their ground, and pretended that the Geneveſe were reſtrained by a former treaty, made at *Soleure*, in the year 1579, from calling for the ſuccours of Zurick and Bern, *without the expreſs conſent of France.*

With this very treaty in their hands, the Geneveſe proved to demonſtration, that it had been made not in favour of France, nor to give her any right whatever in Geneva (15), but that its object was *in favour of the two Cantons of Bern and Soleure, conformable to their requeſt to the King of France, for the common benefit, tranquillity, and ſecurity of Switzerland*, and particularly that, as Geneva *being already allied to the Canton of Bern*, and being alſo *the key and bulwark of the Helvetic Body on that ſide*, it was judged neceſſary that *it ſhould for ever ſtand*, as it were, *independent and connected to Switzerland*;—that, in order to corroborate this connection, which had then ſubſiſted for more than 50 years, it was agreed by this treaty of 1579, that Geneva *ſhould be comprehended in the ancient treaty of union, and perpetual peace, made in* 1516, *between France and Switzerland*:—that the Canton of Bern being bound by former

treaties (16) to aſſiſt Geneva, and being in the actual poſſeſſion of that right, no proviſion was made in the treaty of 1579 againſt the full exerciſe of it:—that, on the contrary, France there acknowledged that right, not only in the Canton of Bern, but in that of Soleure, and in every other Canton which ſhould chooſe to be admitted in the treaty, and *promiſed to defray the expence of ſuch ſuccours* (when called for) to the amount of 1500 men, and to keep the ſums neceſſary for two months pay of theſe troops, depoſited in the hands of the Magiſtrates of Soleure:—that it was only in conſideration of this promiſe, and in the ſingle event of the Swiſs calling for the French money to pay the troops they would lend to the aſſiſtance of Geneva, that the French ambaſſador to Switzerland was to be conſulted about ſending them; but that his *conſent* was in no reſpect neceſſary; for the very treaty, giving him only *one vote* in the Congreſs where that point was to be decided by a majority *(à la pluralité des voix)*, it followed of courſe, that whenever the Cantons ſhould think proper to ſend a garriſon to Geneva, France, *however unwilling*, was bound by the treaty, if required, to defray their expences to the amount already mentioned (17).

The Geneveſe proved, moreover, that the treaty of 1579 having never been executed on the part of France, their anceſtors were obliged, in the year 1584, *with the advice and conſent of the whole Helvetic Body*, to form a new and perpetual confederacy with Zurick and Bern; and that it was in purſuance of this laſt treaty, which had been recognized and excepted in all their negociations with France, that they had ſeveral times received the aſſiſtance of thoſe Cantons. They proved finally, that ſuch an aſſiſtance had been conſtantly required and granted, whenever Savoy was occupied, either by the French or by their allies; and that, even under the deſpotic reign of Louis XIV, that natural and neceſſary conſequence of exiſting treaties was never miſconſtrued either into an offence, or into a breach of the treaty of 1579 (18).

Convinced by thoſe arguments, but induſtriouſly concealing them from the National Convention (19), and being too far advanced to retract their pretenſions, the French leaders again remonſtrated, that being naturally friends and allies of Geneva, they could not but conſider as an injury that jealouſy and diſtruſt, which the Geneveſe had ſhewn towards them, by calling in a Swiſs

a Swiſs force, as if they could poſſibly have had any intentions againſt their liberty. " Are you " afraid of us? *ſaid they*, that fear is an outrage, " for it ſuppoſes that we, the moſt generous, the " moſt juſt, the moſt faithful of all nations, are " diſpoſed to invade your rights and violate our " treaties (20)."

In anſwer to this, every Geneveſe, every reaſonable man, every friend to juſtice, could have ſaid, " If your intentions were pure and friendly, " if treaties, and a due reſpect to the rights of " neutral and independent States were the guide " of your conduct, why did you inveſt your Ge- " neral with that arbitrary power which, but for " the ſtep we have taken, would have laid us en- " tirely at his mercy? Why are theſe troops, " why is that artillery brought before ſuch an in- " ſignificant and inoffenſive town? How long " ſince are the terrors and panick of the tremb- " ling and feeble an offence to the threatening " and powerful? Even had our apprehenſions " been as ill-grounded as they were juſt and ſea- " ſonable, are not yours ridiculous and abſurd to " the higheſt degree?"

The National Convention perceiving, at laſt, what an univerſal horror the attack of Geneva would

would excite againſt their conduct and principles, ſolemnly declared, on the 17th of October, that *if the Swiſs troops evacuated Geneva amicably, the French would reſpect the independency and neutrality of the Republic.* They went ſtill farther, in order the better to enſnare the Geneveſe by an appearance of regard to public juſtice and to their independence, they annulled the Act of guarantee of 1782, as *having been dictated by force of arms, and as being ſubverſive of the liberty of the Republic* (21); and, in the mean time, the Executive Council impowered General Monteſquiou to agree upon ſuch ſtipulations with the Geneveſe, as ſhould be thought neceſſary to enſure the departure of the Swiſs troops.

A treaty was accordingly entered into between that General, as Plenipotentiary of the French, and the Republic of Geneva, on the 22d of October, by *the advice and with the conſent of the Cantons of Zurick and Bern*, and was ratified on the 26th of the ſame month by the Sovereign Council of Geneva (22). In conſequence of which the Swiſs troops began to retire, and the French Reſident, who had quitted the City at their arrival, returned thither on the 27th by the expreſs command of the Executive Council, giving the Geneveſe,

neveſe, in the name of the French nation, *the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of the moſt unalterable friendſhip*, and promiſing that, far from infringing in any way on their invaluable independence, the French *would think themſelves bound to be its firſt defenders.*

Notwithſtanding theſe aſſurances, which are upon record, the treaty, in conſequence of which they were made, was immediately *annulled* on the part of France. A new treaty was then entered on and completed on the 2d of November (23), between the ſame Plenipotientiaries, according to the inſtructions newly ſent by the Executive Council of France, and *with the expreſs approbation of the two Repreſentatives of the Cantons of Zurick and Bern*; in conſequence of which, the Swiſs ſucceſſively withdrew the greateſt part of their forces from the neighbourhood of Geneva; and, like the former, it was, with the ſame faith, *broken* on the part of the French. But the low and wretched artifices which were employed at this time to circumvent both the Swiſs Cantons and the Magiſtrates of Geneva, in order inſenſibly to allure them to abandon thoſe meaſures which they had thought neceſſary for the preſervation of their laws, and of the ſecurity and indepen-

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dency of their reſpective Republics, demand a more particular explanation.

At the time when the firſt treaty was ſigned, General *Monteſquiou*, by a note delivered in the name of the French nation, to the Repreſentatives of the two Cantons of Zurick and Bern, then at Geneva, had entered upon a negociation with thoſe Cantons for the withdrawing of their troops out of the Pays de Vaud, into which they had been ſent for the protection as well of that country as of Geneva; and he had announced that, if this preliminary was acquieſced with, an eaſy and general accommodation of all difficulties between France and Switzerland ſhould immediately take place. The General having already withdrawn ſome few of his forces, and the reſt being, by the treaty, to retire in a ſhort time to the diſtance of ten leagues from Geneva, he eaſily obtained from the Swiſs, that they ſhould accordingly withdraw their forces from the frontiers. With this view, when the difficulties which had ariſen about the ratifying of the firſt treaty were known, they were repreſented as mere matters of form which would ſoon be ſettled, and which ought on no account to affect the peaceable and friendly diſpoſitions of both countries.

Thoſe virtues of which the French make ſo much parade, that unalterable candour, that magnanimity, that fidelity to treaties (ſo often boaſted of in their decrees, addreſſes and declarations), have conſtantly been for ages paſt, and are yet, a ſtrong and leading feature in the Swiſs character; like the ancient Lacedemonian mentioned by Plutarch, *what the former ſpeak of, they perform.* Such an odious treachery as that which was then plotting both againſt them and their allies, could not even be ſuſpected by thoſe ſimple and virtuous Mountaineers; they, true to their word, diſmiſſed the greateſt part of their forces; and when the definitive refuſal of the promiſed ratification of the Geneveſe treaty was known, there was no longer time for the Swiſs to bring warlike preparations to ſuch a point, as might impreſs the French with a due ſenſe of what they owed to juſtice and good faith.

But let us now return to the Geneveſe; as ſoon as they had foreſeen that, for their own ſafety, it would become prudent to diſmiſs the troops of their allies, they thought of augmenting their uſual garriſon to the number of 1200 men. An act was prepared accordingly by the Little and Great Councils between the 28th of October

October and the 5th of November which was afterwards paſſed and approved of by the Sovereign Council, on the 8th of November (23). It will be here proper to obſerve, that this act having been made at a time when a foreign force was on duty in the Republic, it was by the conſtitution of Geneva only *proviſional*, and it was neceſſary that it ſhould be ratified, after the evacuation of the Swiſs troops; but that its execution was to take place as ſoon as the Magiſtrates ſhould deem it neceſſary.

When the enemies of the Geneveſe, in the French Executive Council, had the firſt intimation of this meaſure being intended, they plainly ſaw, that if once Geneva had within its walls a garriſon of 1200 men of their own, ready to ſupport the public order, and to protect the Conſtitution, it would then be indeſtructible, but by thoſe direct and coercive meaſures which could not be made uſe of without a too flagrant and notorious breach of their promiſes. It was in conſequence of this, that the Miniſter *Claviere* (by a note ſent to General *Monteſquiou* in a poſtſcript to the Letter of the Executive Council of the 27th of October, containing the ſeveral alterations deſired in the firſt treaty), demanded that the *Sovereign Council*

of Geneva might not be convoked before the total evacuation of the Swiſs troops; which demand, being a manifeſt and flagrant attack both on the independence of the Republic, and on the very decree of the National Convention of the ſeventeenth of October, *which promiſed to reſpect that independence*, was not attended to in the ſecond treaty.

On this ſecond treaty being ſent to the Executive Council of France, the enemies of Geneva, always active in the purſuit of their plans, endeavoured to revive the demand; and accordingly they ſo far prevailed, as to diſpatch to the army of the Alps a new Plenipotentiary (the citizen *Geneſt*, the then newly appointed Miniſter of France to the States General), and through him renewed a pretenſion which they knew could not be complied with; the abſurdity of which was ſo much the more evident, as the final diſmiſſion of the Swiſs troops could not be effectuated, but by the expreſs conſent of the Sovereign Council expreſsly convoked for that purpoſe.

Senſible of this, the citizen *Geneſt* did not think proper to inſiſt further on this point, but, under pretence of ſecuring to the citizens of Geneva

neva the moſt perfect liberty of voting upon the confirmation of the act for the augmentation of the garriſon, (a liberty which, in an aſſembly where the votes are always given by ballot, could only be impaired by the diſplay of an hoſtile ſuperior force), he allured the Magiſtrates of Geneva into a ſecret promiſe, that the embodying of the recruits might be deferred till after the retreat of the Swiſs troops (the law made on that purpoſe having been legally confirmed), pledging himſelf at the ſame time, that this condeſcenſion on their part would ſecure the immediate ratification of the treaty on the part of the Executive Council.

Principled and virtuous men are hardly led to believe, and far leſs to ſuſpect a perfidious deſign; ſeduced by the appearances of honour and good faith, which the citizen *Geneſt* had diſplayed in this negociation, the Magiſtrates of Geneva did not perceive in his propoſal any thing but a fair opportunity of clearing themſelves of an odious and undeſerved ſuſpicion (24), and they readily promiſed to defer the embodying of the recruits till after the departure of the Swiſs troops. This new compliance they hoped would accelerate the expected ratification; but it only

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ſerved to furniſh both the French and the Geneveſe levellers with a new inſtrument to conſummate the ſubverſion of that unfortunate country. Under various pretences, the report of the ſecond treaty was protracted till the 21ſt of November; when, after having voted a decree of accuſation againſt General Monteſquiou for his manly, generous, and temperate conduct in regard to Geneva (25), and after having haughtily demanded that a rigorous ſearch after his perſon ſhould be made in that city (26), the National Convention, inſtead of the promiſed ratification, *paſſed to the order of the day* on that very treaty, and contented themſelves with directing their Executive power peremptorily to inſiſt on *the Swiſs troops completely evacuating the city by the 1ſt of December*; declaring again, that when that meaſure had taken place, *the French troops would reſpect the neutrality and independence of Geneva.*

Conſidering the particular nature of the miſſion of the citizen *Geneſt*, the condeſcenſion he extorted from the Magiſtrates of Geneva, under the expectation that ſuch a compliance would efficaciouſly accelerate the promiſed ratification, muſt not the breach of this new promiſe be added

to the liſt of ſignal inſtances of bad faith, which the French have diſplayed in the courſe of this negociation (27)?

A great part of the Swiſs troops had already retired from the City and the Pays de Vaud, when this decree, by which the French Convention ſo contemptuouſly paſſed *to the order of the day*, on a treaty ſigned by their Plenipotentiary, was known at Geneva; and as, at that time, the Geneveſe had not been able to obtain from any of the Swiſs Cantons the permiſſion of recruiting for their new garriſon, it was clear to them that they could no longer make an effectual reſiſtance. The attempts too, which through his Britannick Majeſty's generous recommendation, had been made expreſsly to include Geneva as a part, and an effective member of the Helvetic Body, having proved hitherto ineffectual, owing to the procraſtinating conſtitutional forms of that Confederacy, the conſequence was, that a full and unreſerved compliance became the only meaſure that prudence could dictate to the Geneveſe.

By a reſolution of the Sovereign Council of Geneva of the 29th of November, paſſed *after due participation of the advice of the two Cantons of Zurick*

Zurick and Bern, it was accordingly agreed upon, that *the Swiſs troops ſhould retire before the firſt of December*.

Whilſt theſe things were openly tranſacting between France and Geneva, the French leaders, both in Paris and in Geneva, were purſuing in the dark their deep and odious plot againſt the happineſs and independence of that city. From General *Monteſquiou*'s juſtificative Memorial to the National Convention, it appears that *the poſſeſſion of Geneva, and of the adjacent parts of Switzerland*, by the French, was conſidered by the Miniſter *Claviere* as *abſolutely neceſſary to ſtrengthen the revolution of Savoy*, and that he had accordingly given expreſs directions to the General, to *ſpend money in entertainments both to the inhabitants of Geneva and of the Pays de Vaud*, in order to ſeduce them into a *municipalization of their reſpective countries* in the French ſtyle. This plan, which, in regard to *neutral countries* with which the French General was then engaged in negociation, was a moſt flagitious breach of public faith and of the laws of nations, was taken up and followed with activity by thoſe Commiſſioners whom the National Convention had ſent to the army of the Alps. Immediately on their arrival there, and during the General's

General's negociation with the Geneveſe, theſe Commiſſioners gave the ſtrongeſt encouragement to the deſigns of thoſe individuals, whom diſcontent, or a fanatic admiration of the French principles of anarchical equality, had engaged in an oppoſition to the wiſe and vigorous meaſures of their fellow-citizens. One of thoſe Commiſſioners (the ſame who ſo ferociouſly boaſted afterwards to the National Convention of having exhorted *Monteſquiou* to throw ſome bombs into Geneva, in order to accelerate the negociation (28); the citizen *Dubois de Crancé* went ſomewhat farther than his colleagues; he ſeverely upbraided the Geneveſe levellers with their cowardice in reſpect to Magiſtrates, who to him were nothing but *tyrants*; and then, brandiſhing a knife in his hand, like a dagger, he ſhowed them how they ought to deal with thoſe *Magnifiques Seigneurs*, if they meant to ſhow themſelves worthy of thoſe ineſtimable bleſſings of freedom, which the French wiſhed to ſecure to the whole univerſe.

One of the firſt ſteps adopted by the National Convention, after the return of thoſe ill-deſigning and bloody Commiſſioners, was a ſolemn and general declaration, made on the 19th of November, that France *would be ready to fraternize with*

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every people who would conquer their liberty, or, in other terms, *who would rebel againſt the laws and government of their country*, and that *orders accordingly ſhould be tranſmitted to all the French Generals on the frontiers, to give them every kind of aſſiſtance and protection.* In concurrence with this decree, (a copy of which was officially diſpatched to Geneva before it was known to the public) a new train of artillery, of ammunition, and military ſtores, together with freſh troops, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Geneva, at the very time when the laſt corps of the Swiſs troops marched out of the city. And from an apprehenſion that the heart of General *Kellerman*, who had ſucceeded General *Monteſquiou* in the command of the army, might be as acceſſible as that of his predeceſſor to a due ſenſe of honour and juſtice, the French leaders adjoined to him ſeveral outlaws both from Switzerland and from Geneva, who being inſtigated to vengeance by perſonal injuries, would at the ſame time watch over the General, and contribute, through their intrigues and criminal intelligences, to excite, by the adherents of their party, an inſurrection againſt the laws of their country.

Should this inſurrection prove ſucceſsful, it would not fail to be crowned with ſhouts of ap-

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plauſe by the National Convention, and effectually ſupported by the neighbouring French forces. If on the other hand it ſhould, happily for the welfare and tranquillity of Geneva, be quelled, this act of public ſafety would immediately be miſconſtrued into an act of oppreſſion, highly injurious both to the intereſt, the liberal principles, and the majeſty of the French nation, which could not be expiated but by ſhedding the blood, and plundering the property of the citizens.

Agitated for a long time by the ſeditious practices of their chiefs, both within and without the city, the Geneveſe levellers were ready to receive all the impulſions theſe deſigning men meant to incite. Emboldened with the certainty of ſucceſs, derived from that well known diſpoſition of the French National Convention, they began to appear in public with the red cap, to ſing the bloody ſong, which in France has been a ſignal to ſo many aſſaſſinations, to abuſe the few Swiſs troops that then remained in the city, to hold unlawful deliberating aſſemblies, and openly to avow the deſign of a total ſubverſion of the civil and religious conſtitution of the country (29).

As the number of theſe levellers was ſtill too inconſiderable to conquer the peaceable and or-

derly diſpoſition of the people, and their unwearied affection to their independence and conſtitutional forms of government, the French leaders diſpatched there one of thoſe notorious villains, who in every civilized nation ſhould be ſedulouſly excluded from any ſhare in the adminiſtration of public affairs. This man, called *Grenus*, baniſhed from Geneva, in the year 1791, for his riotous and diſorderly conduct, had firſt retired to a ſmall village of France, near Geneva, where he daily employed himſelf, for more than a year, in ſpreading the baſeſt calumnies and the moſt ſlanderous aſperſions againſt his country, and fomenting a ſpirit of rebellion amongſt the lower orders of the people, not only in Geneva, but alſo in Switzerland and Savoy. Beſides ſeveral heavy complaints which were brought againſt him to the French Miniſter from the Governments of Bern and Geneva, his own perverſe and vicious diſpoſition made him equally deſpicable in this new place of his abode, as he had been in Geneva. Obliged to fly from thence, he came to London in July or Auguſt laſt, (amongſt thoſe vile emiſſaries whom the French Jacobines vomited out on every ſurrounding country), but no ſooner did he hear of the French army

my being before Geneva, than he haſtened to Paris, and ingratiated himſelf with the French leaders by thoſe nefarious practices, which have ſince ſerved as a ground of General Monteſquiou's removal and accuſation. After ſuch a trial of his ſkill in the wretched art of intrigue, though a foreigner to France, and a man notoriouſly embarraſſed in his circumſtances, he was immediately appointed to a place both of truſt and of profit, that of *Ordonnateur of the ſubſiſtances*, in the very army which was deſtined to countenance the Geneveſe Revolution; and being abundantly ſupplied with thoſe means of corruption neceſſary to forward the odious deſigns of his employers, he repaired to the neighbourhood of Geneva.

The Magiſtrates of Geneva, alarmed at this new approaching ſtorm, deprived of any hope of being efficaciouſly ſupported by their allies, did not find any ſafer way of ſaving their country, either from internal anarchy, or from the imminent invaſion of the French, than by immediately granting the right of citizenſhip to all thoſe unexceptionable natives and inhabitants of Geneva, who by the former laws could only obtain it by time, and under certain qualifications. A law for this

purpoſe

purpoſe was accordingly prepared by the Magiſtrates, in concert with ſome principal citizens, which was approved of by ſeveral reſolutions of the Little and Great Councils, between the 1ſt and 3d of December, and which, being afterwards made public, was to be propoſed to the Sovereign Council on the 6th of the ſame month.

Two other chapters were added to this law; by the *one*, immediately after the number of the citizens was increaſed by the effect of the firſt chapter, the Sovereign Council was to be fairly conſulted, to know whether they required any farther changes in the laws of the country. If that queſtion were decided in the affirmative, a free and conſtitutional mode was to be eſtabliſhed for preparing thoſe alterations; if in the negative, the ſame queſtion was to be propoſed again for the deciſion of the Sovereign Council in the month of February 1794.

The *other* additional chapter contained the propoſal of a general act of oblivion and abolition of all political offences and judgments from the beginning of this century.

By the *firſt* branch of this law, Government expected to awaken a ſtrong ſenſe of gratitude and attachment to the Conſtitution in the hearts

of thoſe who would be ſo liberally treated. By the *two laſt*, they intended to deprive the levellers of every motive, and even of every pretence for diſturbing the public peace, and to effect amongſt all the Geneveſe a general diſpoſition to quietneſs and conciliation.

It can hardly be doubted, that thoſe wiſe meaſures would have produced this deſired effect; but it was not this that the French and Geneveſe levellers meant to be ſatisfied with. The *former* wanted to make Geneva their *place d'armes*, to cover Savoy, and to pave the way to the conqueſt, or, to ſpeak their language, to *the free reunion* of Switzerland. The *latter* were anxious to aboliſh thoſe ſlow, conſiderate and prudent forms of Conſtitution, which are ſo well adapted to every form of Government, where the large body of the people are their own legiſlators; and which, through a long ſeries of political conteſts in Geneva, have conſtantly preſerved that city from the miſeries of anarchy. Conſcious of the ſmallneſs of their numbers, compared with the reſt of the Geneveſe, their meaſures tended to the abolition of the national proteſtant form of worſhip; ſo that, by indiſcriminately admitting foreigners, and particularly French Catholics, or

Atheiſts

Atheiſts into the city, they might be able more effectually to overwhelm the whole bulk of their fellow-citizens (30).

The ſooner to effectuate their deſigns, theſe political fanaticks flew to arms in the night betwixt the 3d and the 4th of December, bitterly complaining of the ſhortneſs of the delay granted for the conſideration of the laws which were to be paſſed on the 6th, by the Sovereign Council; they ſeized on ſome military poſts, particularly on thoſe which could open a free communication between them and the French army then at Carrouge; and imperiouſly ſummoned the Magiſtrates immediately to ſurrender all the military force of the city into their hands, threatening that, in caſe of non-compliance, the French troops in the neighbourhood would enforce in their favour the decree of the 19th of November, by affording them that effectual aſſiſtance and protection, which the National Convention had ſo generouſly held out to the people of all countries, who would be willing to riſe againſt their own Government, and to conquer their liberty.

In fact, from ſeveral reports made at that time, it appears that, independent of the decree of the 19th of November, the Commanders of the French

French army had expreſs orders for that purpoſe; and the French Reſident himſelf, to whom the Magiſtrates thought proper to apply at this critical conjuncture, gave additional ſtrength to thoſe reports, by inſiſting on the deſired compliance, as the only way to preſerve themſelves from an immediate introduction of the troops into the city (31).

On the other ſide, the ſoundeſt and moſt numerous claſs of the Geneveſe, who could have quelled this inſurrection with the greateſt eaſe, and who were in fact ready and deſirous to do it, earneſtly ſolicited the Magiſtrates for a general order to take arms as the beſt means to reſtore public order and tranquillity. But theſe laſt, conſidering the introduction of the French army into the city as the worſt and moſt irremediable of all the evils which could befal their country, and convinced that, however effectual an oppoſition might be in the firſt moment, it could never ſave the city from ſuch an imminent danger, reſiſted theſe demands, and prevailed on their fellow-citizens to remain quiet in their houſes, and ſuffer every thing to paſs according to the wiſhes of the levellers.

Conſiſtently with this plan of conduct, which

was with great reluctance adopted by the people at large, the Magiſtrates put the levellers in poſſeſſion of all the military poſts; granted a delay of fifteen days for the meeting of the Sovereign Council, which was to decide, on the 6th, on the general admiſſion of the Geneveſe to the right of Citizenſhip, in order to give the levellers an opportunity to explain their further wiſhes, and to afford the generality of the Citizens a competent time to conſider them. The levellers availed themſelves of this condeſcenſion, to appoint a Committee of forty Members to draw up a ſtatement of their demands, and a leſs numerous Committee to direct, in concert with the *Sindic de la garde*, the guard of the city. And from that moment the lawful authority both of the acting Magiſtrates, and of the Little and Great Councils, was reduced to a mere ſhadow.

The French Reſident, having ſo well ſucceeded in forwarding the deſigns of his employers, did not fail to give their protegées every mark of countenance and ſupport. He went in ſtate to the Committee of the Inſurgents, attended by his two Secretaries and four French emiſſaries attached to the legation; and after a congratulatory ſpeech of ſuch a kind as might be expected

on

the occaſion, he told them, " I have juſt now ac-
" quainted the Executive Council with this glo-
" rious revolution, by which all your rights are
" reſtored, and I have no doubt but that the
" French Republic, delighted with your courage,
" will haſten to grant you her protection (32)."

Let the reader reconcile this conduct of the French Agents, this diſpoſition of the French army which we have ſpoken of, with thoſe ſolemn and repeated aſſurances given to the Geneveſe by the Executive Power and the National Convention of France, that, *if the Swiſs troops did evacuate Geneva on the firſt of October*, the French would moſt religiouſly *reſpect the independence and neutrality of the Republic.*

The firſt uſe the levellers made of their new power was, to mount guard with the *red cap*; to receive with open arms, into the city, thoſe *outlaws* to whoſe intrigues they were indebted for their ſucceſs; and eſpecially the profligate *Grenus*; to give the French ſoldiers in the neigbourhood a free admittance (33); together with them, to plant in ſeveral places the *tree of liberty*, to carry in triumph the buſts of Rouſſeau and Voltaire; and in general to mimic all thoſe pageant and licentious parades which the French leaders

have invented, the better to faſcinate the eyes of a miſguided people, and to make up for the loſs of their former regard for laws, religion, and the general order of ſociety. But as, fortunately for the people of Geneva, they are far from being diveſted of thoſe tutelary habits and ſentiments which preſerve the happineſs of every Republican State, a deep and mournful ſilence prevailed through the city during theſe enthuſiaſtic ſcenes, an awful and infallible ſign of the general diſcontent and reprobation. One thing worthy of obſervation to ſuch as are acquainted with Geneva, is, that one of the principal quarters of that city, the very one which has invariably been diſtinguiſhed for the love of its inhabitants for freedom, the *Quartier de St. Gervais*, would never allow the levellers to erect within its bounds the pretended *tree of liberty* (34).

Either convinced by theſe ſymptoms that the minds of the people were not yet ſufficiently corrupted to adopt at once all their political tenets, or having met with ſome oppoſition in their very Committees, the chiefs of the levellers found it neceſſary to proceed gradually in the execution of their plans; and inſtead of bluntly propoſing their new anarchical baſis of regeneration, they thought

thought proper to begin with previouſly making ſuch alterations in the project of law which was to be ſubmitted to the Sovereign Council, as would, by encreaſing and ſtrengthening their influence, more eaſily enſure the ſucceſs of their views for the future.

It was evidently to this end that they propoſed, in the *firſt chapter* of their demands, immediately to extend the right of citizenſhip to every foreigner who ſhould have lived during three years in the Republic, and proviſionally to ſuſpend the effect of thoſe wiſe and ſalutary laws, which incapacitate to vote in any Council all perſons who have not repaid the ſums which they, or their parents, may have received from a public eſtabliſhment of charity, or who have not acquitted the lawful demands made againſt them by the public Exchequer, or who have not diſcharged their ſhare of the debts of their deceaſed parents.

With the ſame view of rivetting more and more the fetters they had prepared for the ancient and well-meaning citizens, in lieu of thoſe conſtitutional forms which the Little and Great Councils had preſerved inviolable in their project for the amendments which could be thought neceſſary to the actual ſyſtem of laws, they demanded,

manded, by a *ſecond chapter*, that the care of preparing a new model of conſtitution be entruſted to a *National Aſſembly* (on the model of that of the French), and that a plan for the electing of the ſame might be propoſed to the Sovereign Council, within fifteen days after the aggregation of the new citizens. And as the very eſſence of ſuch an aſſembly would be a compleat publicity of its meetings, and an unbounded influence of the Galleries, (where the ſober and induſtrious part of the Geneveſe would not like to loſe their time), it is not unlikely that they conſidered the gaining of this point as the utmoſt importance to the triumph of their cauſe.

Theſe two chapters of demands, together with a *third*, containing a complete revocation of all ſentences for political crimes during the preſent century, in the moſt explicit terms, were ſent, on the 11th of December, by the Committee of the 40th to the Little Council, with an order that the Sovereign Council (who, contrary to an expreſs law, could not poſſibly have any knowledge of theſe demands, nor a ſufficient time for conſideration), might be called for the day after. According to the dictate of the levellers, theſe new laws were paſſed *pro formâ*,

formâ, and without any deliberation, in the Little and Great Councils, on the ſame day, and propoſed on the 12th to the Sovereign Council; when, to intimidate the citizens, the levellers, after having openly carried arms, grenades, and military ſtores in their clubs, formed in conjunction with their foreign aſſociates, many numerous armed patroles about the city, and particularly round the church where the Sovereign Council were ſitting; and in general, they ſhewed themſelves ready for an immediate attack, in caſe of non-compliance of the citizens to their wiſhes.

Theſe criminal and alarming manœuvres had the deſired effect. About half of the citizens abſented themſelves from an Aſſembly where freedom was baniſhed, and amongſt thoſe who ventured to attend, a vaſt number, who would never have ſanctioned the propoſed laws, had the Aſſembly been truly and perfectly free, gave them an involuntary vote of approbation, through fear of ſeeing the city a prey firſt to the fury of the levellers, and immediately after to a French garriſon.

It is however remarkable, that, notwithſtanding the coercive meaſures of the levellers, the moſt

moſt exceptionable part of their demands, viz. the chapter relating to the *National Aſſembly*, was only approved by 590 voters, and rejected by 355; ſo that, joining to theſe laſt about a thouſand abſent citizens, it appears that the *noes* would have undoubtedly been about 13 or 14 hundred.

Thus Geneva beheld, for the ſecond time in a period of ten years, a law forced on the majority of its citizens by a minority, who abuſing that power which their foreign connections, and the critical circumſtances of the times, had put in their hands, endeavoured to ſubſtitute their arbitrary will and pleaſure to the conſtitutional laws of the country.

By comparing together theſe two remarkable epochs of the Geneveſe hiſtory, and bringing to recollection the deplorable effects of foreign intervention on the laws of that Republic at earlier periods, a very natural, though melancholy, reflection ſuggeſts itſelf: Had the Magiſtrates of Geneva always been ſo truly attached to the independence of their country, as to have rejected every thought of an increaſe of power acquired through foreign intervention; had they conſtantly given a decided preference to thoſe gentle means

of

of mutual intercourſe and condeſcenſion, ſo eaſy, and at the ſame time ſo powerful, in a ſmall Republic, which is nothing elſe but a large family; had they ſhewn themſelves as ſolicitous to prevent political queſtions, as to have them decided by foreign neighbouring powers, it can hardly be doubted, but that at this laſt epoch the French leaders could never have ſucceeded, notwithſtanding all the activity of their agents, in raiſing amongſt the Geneveſe a party to overturn the laws and conſtitution of the country; for it is obvious, that amongſt thoſe who apparently acted with the levellers, the moſt conſiderable, thoſe whoſe acceſſion gave the greateſt weight to their cauſe, were far from adhering to all their opinions, and were rather actuated by ancient prejudices, and an habitual miſtruſt of the views of Government, than by any real intention to ſubvert thoſe conſtitutional forms under which Geneva had ſo long reſiſted all the miſunderſtandings which uſually attend a Republican Government (35).

Though in ſome reſpects it may be ſaid, that the preſent Magiſtrates of Geneva did not employ, at the time of the changes made in 1791, the beſt means to eradicate thoſe deplorable prejudices; yet

we are happy to acknowledge that this fault has not proceeded from any want of affection to the public good, and that, far from it, at this late epoch, ſenſible of the paſt errors of Government, they ſpared no exertion in their power to reconcile all parties, ſo as to preſerve, unſullied, the liberty and independence of their country: a circumſtance which, while it entitles them to the gratitude and reſpect of their fellow-citizens, cannot fail to reflect additional odium on thoſe deſpicable practices by which the French leaders ſucceeded in defeating their efforts.

The immediate conſequence of the act of the Sovereign Council, ſo viſibly extorted by force on the 12th of December, was, that about 2300 new citizens were added to the number of the ancient ones, who alone had a legitimate right of voting in the Sovereign Aſſemblies. The French emiſſaries, grounding the moſt ſanguine expectations on the ſtrength reſulting to their party from this addition of numbers, began to make different trials of their influence. Sometimes the Citizen *Grenus* propoſed in their Clubs a reunion of the Republic to the Department of the *Mont Blanc* (36), but without ſucceſs. Upon other occaſions, he endeavoured to perſuade them

them of the propriety of making a bloody attack on their oppoſers, ſimilar to that which, he ſaid, the French had ſo happily perpetrated on the 10th of Auguſt. Struck with the general diſguſt expreſſed at this odious propoſal, *Well*, ſaid he, *remember that no revolution will ever ſucceed without a tenth of Auguſt. If you are afraid of ſhedding the blood of your enemies, you have lamp-poſts to hang them on.*

On the greateſt part of the hearers, ſuch horrid ſpeeches had no other effect, but to inſpire them with a deep ſenſe of contempt and deteſtation for the wretch who ſo daringly inſulted their feelings; and had not *Grenus* quickly retired, notwithſtanding the rank he held in the French army, and the fear of drawing on themſelves the vengeance of his employers, he would probably have immediately received, from his own party, the puniſhment which he deſerved.

The effect, however, of theſe infamous attempts to *avignoniſe* Geneva was not entirely loſt; for, on a falſe report being ſpread about that time, that the ancient Procureur General, (who had ſo happily ſucceeded in 1791 in ſettling matters between the Magiſtrates and the Citizens,) had returned to the city, ſome of *Grenus*'s fanatic

followers, who had ſworn that Gentleman's deſtruction, repaired to the houſe of one of his neareſt relations, where they ſuppoſed he would lodge, armed with hatchets, bludgeons, ropes, and other inſtruments of death; broke open the doors and windows of the houſe, rigorouſly ſearched about it, ill-treated, both by abuſe and by-blows, that Gentleman's reſpectable father and a lady of his family, threatened to deſtroy the houſe if they did not deliver them their victim, and could not be prevailed on to retire, till they had received the moſt ſolemn aſſurances, from the mouth of their own chiefs (37), that that Gentleman was ſtill in London, and that he would not be allowed to enter again into the city.

While every honeſt and virtuous heart grieved at ſuch a daring and groſs violation of perſonal ſecurity and property, the lawful Magiſtrates, whoſe authority was annihilated, were very reluctantly obliged to paſs it unnoticed. From that time the lower part of the Geneveſe levellers, emboldened by the forbearance of their oppoſers, did not think proper to obſerve forms any longer. While they were flying to arms on the ſlighteſt pretexts, their Committees negociated with the lawful Magiſtrates

Magiſtrates for ſome proviſional ſettlement which might ſecure to their party a preponderance in the Government. They accordingly drew up ſome propoſals for reducing the number of the *Little Council*, by the expulſion of *fourteen Magiſtrates*, whom they deſigned by name, under colour of a *voluntary retreat*, and for putting the whole military force of the Republic into the hands of a ſelect Committee, which they would contrive to be choſen in the General Aſſembly of the nation. Theſe propoſals were ſuddenly laid before the Little Council on the 25th of December, with an order to have them ſubmitted the day after to the deciſion of the General Aſſembly; where, through the prevalence of the number of the new citizens, they had no doubt of their being approved (38). But on this point their expectations were defeated: for at a meeting, held on the 26th of December, out of 2293 voters, the number of votes againſt the adoption of the propoſals were found to be 1429, and for it only 864.

Enraged at this ill ſucceſs, and fearing that it would be a prelude to the reſtoration of public order, the levellers concerted a new inſurrection in the night betwixt the 27th and 28th of December. They again ſeized on all the poſts, made

made themſelves maſters of the Town-houſe, diſarmed the garriſon, carried the artillery in all the public places of the city, introduced their outward aſſociates, put the chief Magiſtrates under arreſt, and took ſuch meaſures as appeared to them moſt effectual for compelling the Magiſtrates of the Geneveſe to remain ſilent ſpectators of the utter ſubverſion of a Government to which they are ſo ſtrongly attached.

While theſe boiſterous acts were paſſing in the City, the deputies of the clubs of the levellers, together with the deputies of ſome few clubs of well-meaning citizens, who, in order to avoid further miſchief, and to ſave the independence of the Republic, had thought proper to act in concert with the former, duly conſidering the urgency of the moment, the ſcenes of anarchy, confuſion, and bloodſhed, which were likely to enſue from a longer reſiſtance to the wiſhes of the inſurgents, took upon themſelves to proclaim, *in the name of the Nation, a proviſional ſuſpenſion of the Syndics and Council*, and an immediate creation of *two proviſional Committees*, each of them to be compoſed of 13 citizens, elected by the deputies of the clubs; the one called the *Committee of Adminiſtration*, the other the *Committee*

mittee of Safety. This, however, procured a temporary apparent ſtate of tranquillity; and either owing to the influence of ſome few eminent and well-meaning citizens, who were prevailed upon to accept of their appointment in thoſe Committees(*), or overawed by the dread of exciting a ſpirit of revenge in a majority who ſo reluctantly ſubmitted to their empire, if they were once driven to deſpair, the levellers, for ſome time, exerciſed their new power with ſome degree of moderation; but no ſooner was that power ſettled

(*) Amongſt the number of virtuous Citizens to whoſe patriotic exertions and wiſdom, at this critical juncture, Geneva is indebted for the preſervation of the public ſafety and independence, and for the prevention of ſhedding human blood, are to be enumerated Meſſrs. *Micheli*, late Syndic de la Garde; *Bertrand*, Profeſſor of Mathematics; *De Sauſſure*, the celebrated Naturaliſt; *Prevoſt*, late Profeſſor of Belles lettres; *Odier*, an eminent Phyſician; and eſpecially Mr. *Dumont*, who after having written from London ſeveral ſtrong remonſtrances to many eminent characters in France, in favour of his Country, was requeſted by the lawful Magiſtrates of Geneva to haſten to Paris, in order that he might ſupport, by his influence, the independence of the Republic, and from thence to proceed to Geneva, where his preſence and abilities have been univerſally acknowledged by all the well-meaning Citizens, as having contributed greatly to the public peace and ſafety.

ſettled, than they deviated in many inſtances from that temperate line of conduct, by nocturnal domiciliary viſits, and other outrages committed on ſeveral perſons whom they conſidered as their oppoſers. Theſe acts of violence the Proviſional Committees have not been able either to prevent or to puniſh; though very active and ſtrict at other times in repreſſing any demonſtration of diſreſpect to their own perſons or authority.

Notwithſtanding this, ſuch a ſubmiſſion of the well-meaning citizens of Geneva to the temporary overthrow of their lawful Government, will ever be approved of as a prudential meaſure by every one who reflects on the publickly avowed diſpoſitions of the French, and on the joy which was diſplayed in the National Convention, when the news arrived of this acceſſion of a new ſtate to their diſorganiſing principles of anarchy, and more eſpecialy on the ſtep immediately taken by General *Kellerman*, as ſoon as he was informed of it, of ſending an augmentation of forces in the neighbourhood of Geneva to ſupport the inſurgents (39).

The conſequence of this was, that the levellers confirmed the election of the two proviſional Committees

Committees on the 13th of December, in an illegal meeting of the people at large, under the aſſumed title of the *General Council*, or of the *Sovereign Council of the Nation*, convoked at their command, and without the previous deliberation of the Little and Great Councils, a meeting chiefly compoſed of their own party, amongſt whom were many foreigners, who were admitted to vote in it; the uſual forms by which their preſence would have been prevented, having been on purpoſe utterly neglected. They afterwards ſucceſſively paſſed ſeveral acts in the ſame illegal meeting, to put in execution their long dreamt of project of a *National Aſſembly*; which, like the National Convention of France, is to frame, in its public ſittings, the plan of a new Conſtitution for the Republic, and to propoſe it to the General Meeting of the people.

Without any regard either to the nature of ſuch a work, which could only be digeſted by men of experience, in the compoſure of reaſon and in the ſilence of paſſions, or to the ſmallneſs of the Republic, which did not admit of ſuch a numerous Committee (40), or to the wretched ſituation of the finances of the ſtate, which preſcribed the ſtricteſt economy in the public ex-

penditure, they voted their National Aſſembly to be compoſed of 120 citizens, each of whom are to receive a ſalary of 30 crowns a month; and they declared every citizen qualified to be elected a member under 30 years of age; though by the laws of the country ſuch were incapable of holding any public employments. In the ſame way, they ſettled a ſimilar ſalary of *thirty crowns* a month on each member of their two Proviſional Committees; and they conferred on them all the powers of adminiſtration and election, which, by the former laws, appertained, either jointly or ſeparately, to the Syndics, or to the Little and Great Councils.

With reſpect to the finances, it will not be improper here to obſerve, that the part of the public expenditure, relative to the ſalaries of the Councils and of the civil and political Magiſtrates, which hitherto had been only of about 7,000 crowns yearly, will now amount to more than 50,000 (41), that is to ſay, a moiety of the annual ordinary revenue of the Republic.

Thus have they demoliſhed that wiſe and revered fabric of a conſtitution, which was coëval with the liberty of the Geneveſe; whoſe ſalutary effects, notwithſtanding the ſeveral alterations it has

has undergone through the ſucceſſive changes of external and internal circumſtances, have been ſo conſpicuous in the preſervation of that ſame liberty, in the protection of public order, in the increaſe of population and of public and private reſources, in the improvement of religion and morals, in the diffuſion of knowledge, and the promotion of every comfort and happineſs through all ranks and claſſes of ſociety.

In its ſtead, the citizens of Geneva are to content themſelves with the proſpect of a modern ſtyled ſtructure, eſtabliſhed on principles, which, in a neighbouring country, have been hitherto only productive of injuſtice, plunder, and bloodſhed; for the raiſing of which ſtructure, at a time when both public and private finances are exhauſted, when the uſual canals of trade, commerce and induſtry are obſtructed, they are to vote a conſiderable increaſe of taxes, in order to pay the wages of their newly created Solons. Until this work be compleated, the Geneveſe are condemned to live under a *proviſional Government*, moſtly compoſed of men who have no other experience or knowledge of public affairs but ſuch as could be acquired by the peruſal of the French news-papers, and who, beſides, conſtantly

overawed by the very party who placed them in power, and being of courſe an effect of miſtruſt and diſcontent to all the other citizens, will never be able effectually to ſecure the ſafety and the tranquillity of the Republic at large, or in anyways protect the liberty and properties of their fellow citizens.

To every ſenſible obſerver and friend of a true and well-regulated freedom, (who cannot fail to lament theſe abſurd and mimical applications of the French revolutionary principles to a ſmall Republic, where neither grievances nor complaints exiſted, and where, had it been the caſe, it would have been ſo eaſy to have corrected them without any revolution, and by a regular exerciſe of the legiſlative power,) it muſt afford a peculiar pleaſure to hear, that, owing to the naturally cautious and temperate diſpoſition of the majority of the Geneveſe, to their innate adheſion to the independence of their Republic, as well as to the active and generous exertions of thoſe few eminent citizens, who have devoted themſelves apparently to follow the courſe of the torrent, the better to ſtem its ravages, particular care has been taken of guarding againſt the miſchievous effects theſe proceedings might have

with

with reſpect to the independence of the Republic (42).

But, although the hopes of the French leaders of the *free incorporation* of Geneva, in their Grand Republic, appear utterly defeated, it is, however, eaſy to foreſee, that in the chain of events which may take place, the precaution adopted by the Geneveſe, in order to preſerve their independence, may prove inadequate to their object.

The French have, till now, conſtantly kept in the neighbourhood of Geneva, and but at a ſmall diſtance, about 10,000 ſoldiers, who are ready to march at the ſhorteſt notice. Suppoſing then that the ſucceſs of the war, or any other circumſtance, ſhould engage the French to throw off the maſk, which has hitherto covered their ſecret intentions in regard to Geneva, it is ſufficiently evident, that neither the ſpecific oath of maintaining the independency of the Republic of Geneva, taken by the members of the National Aſſembly, nor any limitations reſpecting the number or the influence of the Galleries, nor the expreſs prohibition impoſed on the National Aſſembly, of meddling with foreign affairs, will preſerve the independence and the ſafety of the Republic; for nothing is more eaſy,

at any time, for the French agents in Geneva, than to raiſe diſcontents, either between the Proviſional Committees and the National Aſſembly, or againſt either of them. In ſuch a caſe, a new inſurrection of the fanatic levellers would be ready at hand; and this glorious exerciſe of the firſt right of a free people, according to the French notions, calling for their ſupport, will not fail to throw the Republic into the hands of the French volunteers, who, for no other poſſible purpoſe, are left in the neighbourhood.

Suppoſing, on the other hand, that the French, after having ſuffered ſome eſſential check in their views of aggrandizement towards Italy, ſhould be driven back from the ſtreights of Piemont, and obliged to fortify themſelves in Savoy, will any one doubt but, according to the *ſacred right of convenience*, which is the chief baſis of that new philoſophical ſyſtem of politics, ſo often held up to Europe in the ſpeeches and reports of their *Danton*, *Condorcet*, *Briſſot*, and *Dubois de Crancé*, as well as in the reſolutions of their Executive and Legiſlative powers, they will not think themſelves authorized *to take poſſeſſion of Geneva*, even by force of arms, in order that they might the better protect and ſecure their

their 84th Department, and thereby realize this favourite ſcheme, which the Miniſter *Claviere* had ſo preſſingly urged as *abſolutely indiſpenſable for the ſimple ſecuring of the revolution of Savoy.*

Should either of the above events take place, the Geneveſe will ſee not only their arms, artillery, and military ſtores, but alſo their public granaries, their only reſource againſt famine, ſeized by the French, and applied to their own purpoſes. Happy yet if, at the expence of the reſult of three ages of wiſdom and economy in the adminiſtration of the public finances, they can reſcue themſelves from being witneſſes of thoſe ſcenes of riot, plunder, and aſſaſſination, which, through the unruly and ungovernable temper of the French ſoldiery, have been exhibited in places even, which a general ſimilarity of ſentiments and admiration of French principles ought to have preſerved ſafe and inviolable!

Whatever turn events may take in this laſt reſpect, unleſs the majority of the citizens ſucceed in re-eſtabliſhing public order, and ſettling in Geneva a Government which may be thought as perfectly neutral as the former was, by the ſeveral powers at war, it will be very difficult for the Geneveſe to avoid being alternately beſieged by either

either of theſe powers, and thus reduced to thoſe extremities, from which hitherto both their ſituation, their treaties, and their ancient connections with Switzerland, had ſo long and ſo fortunately preſerved their city?

However imminent might be the dangers which reſult from the preſent ſituation of Geneva, they are not the only ones which call for an immediate attention; ſhould the Geneveſe eſcape the fate they are threatened with, the conſequences of a total change of Conſtitution, introduced there through the intrigues and perfidy of the French, are ſuch, both for Geneva itſelf and for Switzerland at large, as to engage every friend of mankind and public order, to defeat ſuch an unjuſt and flagrant breach of the rights of independent nations.

With regard to Geneva, moſt fortunately for its citizens, the levellers there have no feudal tenure to aboliſh, no nobles to ſtrip of their titles or of their ribbons, no churches or abbeys to plunder, no rich clergy to hunt out of eſtates which religious zeal had in former times ſet apart for the ſupport of public worſhip.

In that city, chiefly inhabited by merchants and artiſts, or by ſuch as are indebted for their wealth

wealth to the ſkill and induſtry of their fore-fathers, ſuch glaring diſtinctions are unknown, which in almoſt every country of a conſiderable extent are held ſacred, either as neceſſary ſupporters of the Conſtitution, as an incitation to virtue, or as a kind of property which could not be trampled upon without endangering the very foundation of ſocial order; and by the great reform in matters of religion, which took place in the 16th century, the Miniſters of the goſpel, no leſs reſpectable for the ſimplicity of their manners than for the purity of their doctrine, and the ſeverity of their morals, receive from the ſtate ſo moderate a pay, as not to admit of any poſſible reduction.

Geneva will then be totally free from thoſe vexatious and inquiſitorial purſuits after the Nobility and Clergy, which, by making ſo many innocent victims, had ſo powerfully contributed to ſpread abroad a juſt and indelible odium on the French revolution, even before the impolitic and atrocious murder of Louis XVI.

But in that Republic, as in every other ſmall ſtate, which nature ſeems to have deſtined to a democratic form of Government, and where the refinements of induſtry, and the improvement of

civiliſation, have made ſuch a remarkable progreſs, there are ſeveral ſhades of diſtinction intimately connected with the civil order, a certain reſpect annexed either to the ancientneſs of families, or to old age, or to affluence, when employed for the public benefit, or to perſonal morality, which it ſhould be even the attention of a legiſlator to encourage by ſome wiſe inſtitutions, rather than to annihilate. By a neceſſary conſequence of the French levelling ſyſtem, theſe will be loſt to the Republic.

Other diſtinctions exiſted in Geneva, which are the immediate effect of its local ſituation, and of the confined ſtate of its territory; and which, though liable to ſome obnoxious conſequences, it would have been the work of prudence to direct towards the public advantage, rather than entirely to level them to the ground, as the inſurgents have done in this revolution.

It is a known fact to every one who has lived in Geneva, that from the ſpirit of enterpriſe of its citizens, which diffuſes them over every part of the globe, as well as from their peculiar turn for certain manufactures, and from the ſituation of their city between France, Switzerland, Germany and Italy, Geneva is expoſed to a continual influx of foreigners

foreigners of every kind, chiefly workmen and artificers of the pooreſt claſs, by the daily admiſſion of whom ſhe makes up for the continual loſſes detrimental to her population, from the emigration of her citizens in foreign parts. A circumſtance which has made it neceſſary for the preſervation of her laws and maxims of government, as well as of her morals, not to admit promiſcuouſly either theſe new ſettlers, or their iſſue, to the full exerciſe of the political rights of citizenſhip. According as the conſtitution of the ſtate has more or leſs deviated from its primitive democratical principle, this admiſſion has been ſubject to more or leſs difficulties. It was, in the commencement of the Republic, not only eaſy, but encouraged by Government; from the latter end of the laſt century it was more ſparingly beſtowed; but in theſe laſt thirty years, experience has ſhewn that a freer admiſſion would be conducive to public peace. By the late changes made in 1791 (which bears a ſtrong likeneſs to the meaſures lately adopted in regard to the Roman Catholics in Ireland), certain moral and pecuniary qualifications were required, under which every ſuch *native* Geneveſe, as was deſcended from a regularly admitted inhabitant of the city, ſhould, *of right*, be conſidered

as a *citizen*. So that henceforward none was to be excluded from the right of citizenſhip, except 1ſt. thoſe who were born of parents who had not been aggregated to the city by any contract; 2d. the ſimple inhabitants, whoſe particular privileges are only derived from the diploma of their admiſſion, and 3d. ſuch of the real natives of the city who, either from their poverty or immorality, could not be ſafely entruſted with a vote in public affairs.

It has been already mentioned that, even previous to the complete evacuation of the Swiſs troops, and in order to unite every Geneveſe in the defence of their conſtitution and independence, the Magiſtrates had thought proper, with the conſent of the majority of their fellow citizens, to extend yet farther thoſe liberal conceſſions of the laws, in favour of thoſe Geneveſe who till then had not been admitted to any ſhare in the legiſlation; but they had carefully and very wiſely preſerved, for the admiſſion to the right of voting, certain limitations eſtabliſhed by law; beyond which neither prudence, nor a due regard to the public welfare, could admit to treſpaſs.

Inſtead of the ſenſe of gratitude and ſatisfaction which this new condeſcenſion ought to have raiſ-

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ed in the hearts of the Geneveſe levellers, it only ſerved to render them more audacious. They ſcorned this patriotic compliance of their Magiſtrates, the generous gift of their brethren, this ſacred and undoubted pledge of peace and friendſhip, and preferred to wreſt by force and inſurrection, than obtain, in a lawful and regular way, what, till then, they had held up as the end of their wiſhes. Confiding on the promiſed ſupport of France, they improved the opportunity by arrogance and riot, and not ſatisfied with aboliſhing every limitation whatever, they granted even to foreigners, who had lived in the city the three laſt years, the full right of citizenſhip; by which means they have ſecured to their party, in thoſe ſpurious meetings which they decorate with the name of *General Aſſemblies of the Nation*, a majority which, unleſs ſome ſtrong and cogent circumſtance bring them back to their true intereſts, is very likely to prevail in the formation of the new laws, and which, of courſe, cannot be expected to give the Republic any other form of conſtitution, but ſuch as, being grounded on inſurrection, will continually expoſe the tranquillity and the ſafety of the citizens, to the ſame riotous ſhocks to which it has been indebted for its birth.

This revolution cannot be therefore confounded with thoſe ſeveral modifications of the laws which, according to public exigencies, and the courſe of human events, a prudent legiſlature will, from time to time, admit as neceſſary in every republican ſtate, and whoſe wiſdom is, in ſome degree, vouchſafed and guaranteed by a ſcrupulous adheſion to the conſtitutional forms required for their ſanction. This is a notorious breach of all divine and human laws, a downright uſurpation of a lawful ſovereignty, practiſed by a ſmall minority of thoſe who had a ſhare in that ſovereignty, in combination with mere aliens, and with others who, having voluntarily ſworn allegiance to that ſovereignty, could have no other claim to it, but ſuch as ſhould be imparted to them by a free and voluntary conſent of the lawful owners.

It is evident, from the treaties by which Geneva is ſo intimately united to the Cantons of Zurick and Bern, that neither of theſe Cantons, nor, of courſe, any of the other ſtates which form the Helvetic body, can acknowledge as legal either the proviſional changes which, through Jacobine intrigue, have been made in the Republic, or thoſe which, in the mind of the Geneveſe

neveſe levellers, will be their conſequence. In thoſe ſolemn deeds of Helvetic faith and honour, theſe Cantons have treated with the *General Council of the citizens of Geneva*, a Council who, from the birth of the Republic, has been her only lawful *Sovereign*. With it they have contracted a *perpetual alliance, friendſhip and confederation*; to it alone they have ſworn *to be true and faithful, to advance its welfare, honour and proſperity, to avert from it every danger*. From it only they have *accepted and received the ſame mutual oaths and promiſes*. Acknowledging in Geneva, either a ſpurious Sovereign in lieu of the lawful one, with whom they have treated, or another Government but that one which has the legal ſtamp of the authority of that Sovereign, would be, on their ſide, a notorious breach of thoſe ſacred and ſolemn engagements which they have, till now, ſo religiouſly maintained, a breach, no leſs incompatible with the true intereſt of Switzerland, than with Helvetic candour and good faith.

WITH REGARD TO SWITZERLAND, no one will deny that this revolution in Geneva offers a precedent of the moſt dangerous tendency to that ancient and reſpectable confederacy, not only for the ſtability of the reſpective conſtitutions of its

ſeveral ſtates, but for the peace and happineſs of their inhabitants, who, ſhould the intrigues of the French be crowned with ſucceſs in Geneva, would infallibly be provoked, by the arts of ſedition and violence, to open rebellion, in order to ſubſtitute a deluſive phantom of licentious liberty to the real bleſſings of true and peaceable freedom, which they have ſo long enjoyed under their reſpective Governments.

It has been obſerved, by one of the wiſeſt ſtateſmen of this country, that it would be equally injurious to Great Britain, whether the Belgic provinces were *nominally* united to France, or whether they were *forced*, by the intrigues of France, into a ſimilar diſorganiſed form of Government, as that which now prevails in that country. The ſame may be ſaid of Geneva with regard to Switzerland, and of Switzerland itſelf with regard to Europe.

Let a city, which for ages paſt has been *connected* to the Helvetic confederacy, and always conſidered as its *chief key and bulwark*, be either directly or indirectly ſeized from her by the French, and Switzerland will, of courſe, irretrievably loſe that force of reſiſtance, that external reſpectability which, from her firſt acceſ-

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ſion to freedom, has proved to her an effectual ſtop to the aggrandizement of ſeveral powers of Europe towards Italy.

Let Switzerland, in courſe of time, through the power of example, and the clandeſtine workings of an active and enthuſiaſtic ſect, be weakened on the ſide of the *Pays de Vaud*, the *Bas Vallais*, and other parts adjacent to *Geneva* and *Savoy*, as ſhe is already on the ſide of the *States of Porentru*, how will ſhe be able to avoid becoming ſucceſſively a prey to the ambitious projects of the French, who, according to the opinion of the moſt moderate amongſt their leaders, will not reſt, till they have included in their limits the Rhine, the Alps, and the Apeninnes?

Let this new dream of French delirium be realized, either by what they call a *free reunion*, like that of Savoy and Nice, who, under the reſtraint of a victorious army, and in the midſt of a licentious ſoldiery, have been forced into a partial and momentary wiſh of becoming an 84th and an 85th departments, or by a *total change* in the conſtitution of the Swiſs Cantons in conſequence of French principles; and the peace of all the States of Europe, together with the happineſs of their inhabitants, is for ever ſmother-

ed under the ruins of their reſpective governments.

Geneva has then every reaſon to expect from her ancient, faithful, and natural allies, not only a decided and unweary perſeverance in refuſing any official communication with the uſurpers of her ſovereignty, but alſo a real and laſting determination to aſſiſt her, both in reſtoring that ſovereignty to its legitime owners, to whom theſe Cantons are pledged by treaties, and in ſecuring it by a cloſer union to the Helvetic Confederacy, which, for ages paſt, has been the conſtant object of every true Geneveſe to accompliſh.

However difficult this undertaking might appear to ſuch as, without any regard to circumſtances, form their judgment only from the ſuddenneſs of the fall of the ancient Conſtitution, and the fanaticiſm which has been diſplayed in its ſtead, every one who is acquainted with Geneva will concur in the opinion, that a complete reſtoraration is very near to be effected in the hearts of the great majority of its inhabitants. The increaſing arrogance of the lower claſs of the levellers; their aſſociation with men who never had any right, nor any pretence whatever, to claim a ſhare in the Conſtitution; the miſtruſt they begin

begin to ſhew, both for their Proviſional Government, and for that very National Aſſembly which they were ſo eager to eſtabliſh; the compariſon which the good and honeſt huſbandmen, inhabitants of the Geneveſe territory, are now able to make between the condition they were in, under the former laws of Geneva, and the deplorable ſituation of the new ſelfcreated ſovereigns of the adjacent parts of France and Savoy; all theſe concomitant circumſtances will, ſooner or later, revive and diffuſe, amongſt the majority of the true Geneveſe, a general diſguſt for any form of Conſtitution, however beautiful in theory, which, grounded upon inſurrection, would be neceſſarily and invariably attended with reſtleſſneſs, ſedition and miſchief. Senſible of the diſhonourable and criminal views, to which many of them have been hitherto the blind and wretched inſtruments; ſtruck with their own imprudence, and with the dangers to which their wonted independence would be expoſed, by a prolongation of diſcord amongſt ſuch as conſider it as the firſt of all bleſſings, they will renounce all their former animoſities, ſacrifice all ſpirit of revenge, and every exceſſive pretenſion, to the great and ſalutary end of uniting for the re-eſtabliſhment of

public order. The wiſh of the majority of the ancient citizens is already known. No doubt but it will ſoon be re-echoed by all thoſe who, either through thoughtleſſneſs or a miſguided zeal, have concurred in its ſubverſion, and be ſupported by every one amongſt the new citizens, whoſe acceſſion to that quality may be conſidered as a real acquiſition to the Republic. United by a common and unwearied ſenſe of duty to their country, they will find, in the notorious violation of every law which has ſignalized the late diſorders, the very means of healing the wounds which have been made againſt their happineſs and tranquillity, and all join with one voice to expreſs their determined reſolution, not only to live and die Geneveſe, but to live and die faithful to their ancient form of Government.

SHOULD the prevailing power of external circumſtances protract the emiſſion of this general will, this will be no reaſon to deſpair: for unleſs, by a ſeries of unexpected triumphs, the leaders of France ſucceed in their horrid ſcheme of diſorganiſing Europe, the moment muſt come, when the ſelfiſhneſs and perfidy of thoſe leaders,

(who,

(who, like the Patricians of Rome, have inceſſantly embroiled their country in war, in order to perpetuate their empire) ſhall be unmaſked; when the contradiction of their firſt declarations, with their real conduct and deſigns, will be pointed out and made ſenſible, not only to the ſeveral powers of Europe, but to that very deluded people they have ſo long made a victim to their frantic ambition; they will then be called to an account for thoſe turbulent and licentious practices, the diffuſion of which they endeavour to ſubſtitute to the long and juſtly revered laws of nations; for thoſe daring breaches of exiſting treaties (43), which have taken place of that hypocritical reſpect they profeſſed for them; and for the flood of human blood they have ſpilt, in the name of philanthropy and liberty, on the altar of their unbounded pride.

At that time, when the foreign enterprizes of the French ſhall be weighed in the ſcale of ſtrict juſtice, it will be fairly examined how far conſiſtent, not only with the repoſe of Europe, but with the peace and happineſs of the French nation, are thoſe wild principles their leaders have of late laid down, as the foundation of their politics towards foreign nations? How far is it proper, that

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they ſhould arrogate to themſelves the right of provoking other countries to riot and inſurrection againſt their lawful Governments? How far they may annul, on their ſide, every treaty with other powers, while they make it a lawful ſubject of war with them, to pretend to the ſame prerogative? How far, in ſhort, under colour of a *free re-union* of neighbouring countries, procured either by the French armies, or by French intrigues, they may aggrandize themſelves, and extend the boundaries of their dominions?

Recalled to a due ſenſe of reaſon and juſtice, and to true notions of liberty, by the very calamities the imprudence and the paſſions of their leaders will have drawn upon them, by the dilapidation of their finances, the annihilation of their trade and reſources, the loſs of their colonies, the increaſe of their anarchy, and the fall of ſo many thouſand victims of a deplorable ambition, the French will bitterly reflect on all thoſe enterpriſes into which they have been ſo inconſiderately led; on the very exceſſes they were deſtined to cover; and on the miſchievous ſyſtem of Government, which, in ſo ſhort a period, has perverted the character of a nation, formerly remarkable

markable for her amiable and benevolent temper and diſpoſition.

It is chiefly to Great Britain that the leading of this truly glorious revolution ſeems devolved, by her ſituation, by the purity and nobleneſs of her motives, as well as by her principles of Government, and the wiſdom of her Councils.

For more than a century, this Iſland, exhibits to the eyes of the practical philoſopher the happieſt ſyſtem of Conſtitution which human prudence could digeſt. A Monarch the maintainer of liberty, a free People the ſupporter of Royalty, and a Nobility ſo intimately connected with both, as to be the ſacred and mutual tie of their undefeaſible union. On this noble baſis, ariſes a legiſlature, under which both civil and religious laws are revered, property ſecured, induſtry encouraged, commerce and trade promoted, arts and ſciences improved, and every comfort and bleſſing diffuſed through all ranks of ſociety.—Such, *at home*, are the fortunate effects of the Britiſh Conſtitution; *abroad*, they are no leſs conſpicuous in a due and conſtant attention to the liberty of Europe, and the independence of its ſeveral ſtates, in a manly and unwearied application to defeat thoſe ambitious deſigns,

which,

which, from time to time, have diſturbed the general peace, or threatened that equilibrium of power, without which Europe would be a continual ſcene of war and oppreſſion.

During theſe long diſtractions, by which the external conſequence of France ſeemed annihilated, paſt injuries, which it would have been ſo eaſy to reſent, have been forgotten. The manifold marks of malevolence on the part of that country; their injuſtice towards the Britiſh inhabitants of Tobago, and their long repeated neglect of the recommendations of the Britiſh Government in their favour; their hoſtile and wanton preparations in ſupport of Spain; their affected contempt for Britiſh forms of Conſtitution, in anſwer to the kind and generous aſſiſtance lent to their Colonies by the Britiſh Government; the falſe and injurious imputations made by their chief leaders, both to the King and to his Miniſters, in their public reports and avowed writings, have paſt unnoticed; peace has been maintained, and a friendly intercourſe and a good neighbourhood have been conſtantly preſerved.

When France, engaged in war with other powers, for the ſupport of her independence,

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and of the right which belongs to every free ſtate, of making laws for itſelf, demanded of England her neutrality, under the moſt ſolemn and explicit declarations of her renouncing all views of aggrandizement and conqueſt, of holding ſacred the rights of Britain and of her allies, and of conſtantly abſtaining from any interference into the internal politics of neutral ſtates; neutrality was readily granted, and moſt religiouſly adhered to.

It was only when the French, emboldened with ſucceſſes, had retracted theſe declarations; when they had avowed their ambitious views of aggrandizement; when they had infringed the rights of the Britiſh allies, violated their territory, annulled ſolemn treaties, openly countenanced Britiſh rebels, and, by expreſs decrees, declared to all the Governments of Europe the odious war of inſurrection, that Great Britain has begun to provide for her defence and ſafety. It is at laſt when, at the very time of an aſked-for negociation, the French leaders have exhorted the inhabitants of their ſea-ports to arm, in order to pillage Britiſh veſſels, and to invade Great Britain; when, on the moſt abſurd pretexts, war has been actually declared to her by them; when

hoſtilities have commenced on their ſide; when, in defiance to an expreſs treaty, they have ſeized on the perſons and properties of Britiſh ſubjects, that Great Britain has united in the common cauſe of Europe!

Let not this long forbearance of Britain be miſtaken for indifference to this grand and important cauſe. The longer may have been her deliberation, the more mature will be its reſult, the more likely will it be to enſure her a glorious and happy ſucceſs.

On the part of France, this is not a national war; but only the war of a deſperate faction who, while they were at home overturning all the lawful authorities, trampling upon every moral and religious principle, breaking through the moſt ſolemn oaths, ſtripping and exiling both their clergy and their nobleſſe, murdering a guiltleſs, humane, and benevolent Prince, and on the ruins of his throne erecting, under the name of Republic, the moſt daring, odious, and bloody deſpotiſm, have bid ſucceſſively defiance to all Europe; and, in their fooliſh and criminal conceit, endeavoured to ſpread, every where around them, their anarchy, their atheiſm, their miſery, their contempt for every tie of morality, the

the longer to ſtand their ground, and ſtrengthen thereby, both on their deluded followers and on the people at large, that abſolute command which, except at a time of general confuſion, they feel themſelves unable to maintain.

On the part of Britain, it is the war of a generous, loyal, united, and orderly nation, who wants to keep inviolable her liberty, her religion, her morals, her internal tranquillity, her virtuous and beloved Monarch, and thoſe bleſſed principles of Conſtitution, the wiſdom of which a long and happy experience has endeared to their hearts: it is a war of prudence, of juſtice, of faithfulneſs to treaties; a war of ſelf-defence, abſolutely neceſſary to ſecure peace, and which calls forth in its favour the bleſſing of the SUPREME DISPENSER OF EVENTS, and the united and moſt ardent prayers of Europe.

To Great Britain will the oppreſſed ſtates now look for their relief; *Holland* and the *German Princes*, for the reſtoration of their rights, and invaded territories; the *King of Sardinia*, for the recovery of his diſtracted and oppreſſed dominions; *Switzerland*, for the preſervation and improvement of her boundaries, and the ſtrengthening of her union; *Geneva* for her delivery.

From her alone this laſt ſmall Republic may expect that tender regard due to the feeble and virtuous, by the mighty and powerful; that ſtrict attention to her ſituation, to her laws, to her liberty; and, above all, that unerring juſtice, which, ponderating every circumſtance of the conduct of her citizens, will ſhew them a true object of commiſeration and eſteem, particularly deſerving the reſtoration of thoſe bleſſings, which they have ſo long and ſo dearly defended, and which, but for an outward and irreſiſtible force, they would now enjoy in peace and harmony.

FEBRUARY, 1793.

NOTES.

NOTE (1), *page* 5. This fact is asserted in the letter of the Syndics and Council of Geneva to the French Minister Le Brun of the 21st of October. The arms mentioned in that letter, as having been lent to the people of the neighbouring districts, have not yet been restored.

Note (2), *p.* 5. Whenever a scarcity of provisions has been felt in the neighbouring provinces, it has ever been the constant practice of the Republic of Geneva to lend their inhabitants, out of her own public granaries, the corn they might be in need of, either for their own subsistance or for sowing. Such an opportunity offered itself in the summer 1791, and on that occasion the Constituent Assembly passed a vote of thanks to the Republic. Since that time the Genevese, actuated by a sense of humanity and friendship to their neighbours, as well as from sound policy, converted this wise and generous custom into a law.

Note (3), *p.* 5. Notwithstanding all the efforts of some French clubbists and anarchists, to create jealousies and misunderstandings between Geneva and the Administrations of the neighbouring Municipalities and Districts, the wise, circumspect, and friendly conduct of the Magistrates of Geneva has constantly been effectual in preserving the most perfect and unalterable harmony.

Note (4), *p.* 6. Here it is to be observed that, in the year 1782, the French Minister, the Count de Vergennes, after having

having ſucceeded, through the influence of his agents, in ſtopping the progreſs of a general code of laws, which had been loudly invoked by the public voice ever ſince the commencement of this century, and in ſtirring up the natives of Geneva, together with ſome citizens, to inſurrection, availed himſelf of this opportunity, to unite againſt the Republic the arms of the three ſurrounding powers, in order to deprive them of their laws and conſtitution; and when, having occupied the city with an army of thirteen thouſand ſoldiers, and inſtantaneouſly disfranchiſed about the three-fourths of the citizens, he propoſed a new ſyſtem of laws to the remaining fourth, and obtained their approbation; by which an oppreſſive military government was eſtabliſhed, which, being almoſt equally diſliked by the magiſtrates and the citizens, was deſtroyed in January 1789. But at this laſt period, thoſe who had the greateſt ſhare in making the ſettlement which took place, were in ſuch a hurry of getting rid of the Vergennian military deſpotiſm, that they neglected completing its ruin, by reſtoring the Geneveſe conſtitution to its primitive principles. Accordingly the ſovereignty of the General Council of the citizens, the freedom of the preſs, and the right of petition, the moſt ancient birth-right of the citizens, remained in oblivion; the popular elections continued either ſuppreſſed, or reduced to a mere ſhadow; the admiſſion of the natives to the rights of citizenſhip even was not reſtored to the ſame extent as before the year 1782, and a ſelect military corps was eſtabliſhed amongſt the Geneveſe, to aſſiſt the ancient garriſon in overawing every complaint, which ſuch imperfect changes were likely to excite. This had ſcarcely been effected a few months, when a great number, both of citizens and natives, appeared diſſatisfied at the loſs of ſo many valuable prerogatives; and, but for the new

changes

changes made in 1791, there is hardly a doubt that the independence of Geneva, at the time of the invaſion of Savoy by the French, and even before, would have been annihilated.

Note (5), *p.* 9. Had the plans of this citizen, at this critical juncture, been completely followed, it is now evident, that all thoſe ſcenes of confuſion and anarchy, which have for ſome time diſgraced the Republic of Geneva, would have been moſt efficaciouſly prevented. Both the natives and the ancient Geneveſe of the country, ſatisfied with the title of citizens, would have had no objection to thoſe reſtrictions, by which every improper perſon might be excluded from voting. The citizens, on their ſide, would have given a readier aſſent, and been more firmly attached to the laws, had they been prepared by a commiſſion of their own choice (as it was the wiſh of that citizen). And if, inſtead of that partial and ill-judged coalition of Clubs, which bore every appearance of diſcord in the midſt of harmony, a general and permanent ſyſtem of friendly intercourſe had been eſtabliſhed between the Government and the people, it might naturally be concluded, that every rank of Geneveſe being united together by ſuch ſtrong ties, their union, notwithſtanding all the efforts of the French anarchiſts, would have proved indiſſoluble.

But, however effectual the plans alluded to might have been in ſecuring the public tranquillity, and ſtrengthening the eſtabliſhed Conſtitution againſt the encroachments of the French principles, it cannot be matter of ſurpriſe that they were not completely adopted, when it is conſidered that, on the one hand, many amongſt the friends of the Magiſtracy, either looked back with regret on the prerogatives they were to relinquiſh, or were not diſpoſed to fraternize with men whom, from their childhood, they had been accuſtomed to look upon

upon as their inferiors; and on the other hand, that a number of Citizens, animated with a ſpirit of revenge for old injuries, or elated with the ſucceſs of the French revolution, were endeavouring, under a ſpecious pretence of liberty, to carry their pretenſions farther than the general welfare required. To many others, the very idea of ſharing their rights with the Natives was quite diſgraceful; while to many of the Natives, nothing but a general and unreſerved admiſſion to the rights of Citizenſhip could be deemed ſufficiently ſatisfactory. In the midſt of ſuch a variety of opinions and of oppoſite intereſts, however imperfect the laws then paſſed might appear, it will be an eternal honour to Geneva, that the voice of reaſon and prudence was attended to by the majority of the people, and that they had been able, under ſuch circumſtances, to concur in making, freely and peaceably, an agreement amongſt themſelves which, but for the baſe and infamous practices which we are now to relate, would have infallibly preſerved the liberty, the tranquillity, and the independence of their Republic.

Note (6), *p.* 10. Previouſly to the propoſing of thoſe laws to the Sovereign Council of the Citizens, the right of petition, which they had been deprived of ever ſince 1782, was reſtored to them; public conferences were held, in which every one was admitted to offer his ſentiments and to hear the explanations he could wiſh for; after which the new laws were amended, almoſt unanimouſly approved by the *Little and Great* Councils, and ſanctioned by the Sovereign Council, on the 22d of March 1791, by a majority ſuperior to the three fourths of the votes. They have ſince been corroborated and enlarged in the *Code Genevois*, which was approved of, by all the Councils of the Republic, in the month of November following.

Note

Note (7), *p.* 12. The Treaty of Neutrality of 1782, which is mentioned and explained from page 13 to 16.

Note (8), *p.* 12. What a ſhare the French Miniſter *Claviere* had taken in all theſe tranſactions, between France and his native Country, may be collected, not only from the *Memorial* publiſhed by *General Monteſquiou in juſtification of himſelf*, but ſtill more particularly from that portion of his *Correſpondence* with the *General*, which the *Miniſter* has thought proper to publiſh in his own defence at two different periods. It is to be expected that *the General* will, on his ſide, complete the information, by giving to the public the reſt of that intereſting correſpondence, and four unpubliſhed letters of the *Miniſter Claviere*, which may throw new light on the views of the French and on the principles which actuate their conduct towards other nations. It is however evident, by thoſe very letters which the *Miniſter Claviere* has publiſhed, that all the *General*'s quotations and aſſertions, contained in his letter to the Preſident of the National Convention, are perfectly accurate;—that the *Miniſter Claviere* had given him particular directions concerning Geneva previous to his invading Savoy;—that he ſtrongly inſiſted with the *General*, ſometimes on the neceſſity of having that City occupied by French troops *to ſecure the poſſeſſion of Savoy*, ſometimes on the ſupport to be given to what he called the *patriotic party* there, in order to create a revolution in that Republic;—that though he deny having had any ſhare in the demand of puniſhment made by the Executive Council of France againſt the Magiſtrates of Geneva, the fact is, that he falſely imputed to them the intention *of calling in a Piedmonteſe garriſon*, and no leſs falſely accuſed them of *having entered into the coalition of the powers at war with France*, and of having exerciſed an abſurd degree *of influence over the Swiſs Cantons*;—that while he expreſſed the

utmoſt tenderneſs for that part of the people living in Geneva, who being merely *aliens*, are by law diſqualified to have arms in their poſſeſſion, while he deprecated in their favour only the calamities in which they might be involved by the reſiſtance of the citizens, he ſpoke of theſe laſt, amongſt whom were all his ancient friends and relations, as *of Ariſtocrats, of mere fools, who, notwithſtanding all their fine appearance, did not deſerve that an enlightened ſoul ſhould take any concern about them except to humble them*;—that in one of his letters, he ſuggeſted the ſettlement of a French garriſon in Geneva, *to facilitate the amendments to be made in the Geneveſe conſtitution*, while in another, he ordered the General to inſiſt on the Sovereign Council not being convoked while the Swiſs were in Geneva, *that the liberty of its citizens might not be influenced by their preſence.*

Such a conduct in a *Geneveſe* by birth, could never be explained but by his being too deeply prepoſſeſſed in favour of French principles, to regard either juſtice or even common decency, when their univerſal propagation throughout the world was in queſtion. It is this very explanation which the Citizen *Briſſot*, one of that Miniſter's moſt intimate friends, has given in No. 1230 of the *Patriote François*, where he ſays:

" Clavière eſt Miniſtre de la Republique Françoiſe, il eſt mon " ami; &, chargé deux fois par le Comité Diplomatique " de rapporter l'affaire de Genève à l'Aſſemblée Nationale, per- " ſonne n'en connoit mieux que moi les détails; nul n'eſt donc " appelé par des motifs plus impérieux à dire la vérité, & je la " dis à l'inſu de Clavière.

" J'affirme que, dans les nombreuſes conférences qui ont eu " lieu, ſoit au Comité, ſoit avec le Conſeil Executif, Clavière " n'a jamais paru animé par des reſſentimens particuliers; qu'il " n'a été guidé que *par le déſir de faire ſervir l'affaire de Genève*

" *à*

" *à la cauſe générale de la liberté*; que ſon but étoit, *non ſeule-*
" *ment de venger la gloire de la Republique Françoiſe*, mais en-
" core de *faire triompher le parti populaire*, celui de l'égalité;
" *tel doit être le but de tout François, de tout Miniſtre ou Agent de*
" *la Republique Françoiſe.*"

Note (9), *p.* 14. This blunder of the French Reſident was animadverted upon by the French Miniſter for foreign affairs in his Letter of the 1ſt of October to the Reſident, being the fourteenth number of a *Complete Collection of State Papers*, concerning this affair printed in London. It is ſomewhat extraordinary that, notwithſtanding this animadverſion of the French Miniſter, the ſame blunder was committed again by the Citizen *Briſſot*, in his report to the National Convention of the 16th of October, where he bitterly complains of the Canton of Bern, for not having requeſted the French to appoint an Ambaſſador in order to ſettle matters with them about the ſending of the Garriſon, *according to that very ſecond article of the Treaty of* 1782, which in reality was not at all in point to the matter at iſſue.

Note (10), *p.* 15. By that treaty of 1584, which will be more fully mentioned hereafter, the two Cantons of Zurick and Bern, and the Republic of Geneva, reciprocally received one another *as true and perpetual allies and confederates, promiſing and ſwearing that each party would be faithful and ſincere to each other; would advance the profit, the honor, the good and proſperity of the other; would avert its dangers, and generally would perform and maintain, towards each other, every thing that becomes and appertains to true and faithful allies and confederates.* It was moreover ſtipulated that Geneva ſhould, in caſe of a war, give ſuch ſuccours to the Cantons of Zurick and Bern as they ſhould require, and that reciprocally theſe two Cantons ſhould do the ſame towards

Geneva, *againſt any power whatſoever.* The ſuccours ſo given were to be ſupported, *one half by the aſſiſting party, and one half by the aſſiſted*; which ſhows how little, at that time, thoſe Republics depended on the promiſe made by France, in the treaty of 1579, to *defray the expences* of the ſuccours to be given to Geneva by the Cantons; a promiſe which, in fact, was never executed.

Note (11), *p.* 16. By the firſt article of thoſe laws, the right *of calling in a Foreign Auxiliary force* was inſerted amongſt the powers attributed to the General Council of the citizens.

Note (12), *p.* 16. In fact, had Geneva no law of her own to alledge in favor of the demand of the Swiſs ſuccours, nor any treaty in virtue of which ſhe could claim it, her univerſally acknowledged independence and ſovereignty was a fully ſufficient plea to warrant the appeal of a *neutral* force at a time of war between two of her neighbours. On the ſide of the French, their acknowledging that independence and ſovereignty, at the ſame time that they ſo bitterly complained of its exerciſe, was a moſt palpable and abſurd contradiction.

Note (13), *p.* 17. On the 10th of October, the Geneva Legion, to the amount, at that time, of more than 3000 men, unanimouſly approved of the conduct of their Magiſtrates, and ſwore to defend their country from the oppreſſion of the French. This declaration was repeated and ſupported, on the ſame and the following days, by all ſuch as were then on duty at the different military poſts, by the veterans and others who, by infirmity or office, are exempted from ſerving as ſoldiers, and at laſt by the country people, who were not preſent when the ſenſe of the Legion was taken on the ſubject. The whole number of perſons who thus teſtified their approbation amounted to about 4500. Such a reunion of men had never been ſeen in Geneva at any

time, on any occaſion whatſoever. A ſingle characteriſtical fact, very honourable to the Geneveſe, I beg leave to relate on this occaſion: On the 10th of October, out of the whole Legion, only *four* aſked time to conſider of the matter, which was readily granted to them; and accordingly they went home, without being expoſed to any injury or any mark of diſapprobation whatever. Such are the effects of *true liberty* on a ſober and moral people, who *truly* deſerves to be *free*. Had any ſuch thing happened in France, would any one have felt ſuch a confidence in the virtue and moderation of his fellow citizens, as to oppoſe their general will at ſuch a juncture? or if any one would have dared to do ſo, who would ſuppoſe that he would have been treated in the like manner as thoſe *four oppoſers* were in Geneva? See the above-mentioned Collection of State Papers, No. XII, page 42.

Note (14), *p.* 18, General Monteſquiou, whom we allude to, is a man who, to the moſt diſtinguiſhed birth, joins the moſt exquiſite good ſenſe, and the moſt elevated ſoul; ſenſible of the diſgraceful and diſhonourable views of ſome of the French Leaders with reſpect to Geneva, he long deprecated their tyrannical orders, with all the ſtrength of a feeling and reaſonable man; he declared to ſeveral Geneveſe that, in caſe they would agree to the diſmiſſion of the Swiſs troops, his intentions were that France ſhould treat with them on the footing of mutual friendſhip and of the moſt perfect equality; conſcious that every clauſe of ſuch a treaty, which would thus be honourable and ſatisfactory to the ſmall Republic of Geneva, muſt neceſſarily and excluſively operate to the real advantage of the great and powerful Republic of France, by impreſſing all over Europe a ſtrong ſenſe of their regard to juſtice and to the Rights of Nations, he directed to that end not only his correſpondence with

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the Executive Power and with the Minister Claviere, but the very terms of the Treaty. Such delicacies as these of a great and generous mind could not be understood by the diplomatic rulers of France; but they saw plainly that such a disposition in the General would, however, be most efficaciously conducive to their purposes. Upon this, they contrived to let him follow his own way, and even encouraged him by marks of approbation and confidence, which were easy for them at any time to withdraw. When their plot was ripe, they at one stroke completed the destruction of a General, whose nice feelings and abilities were, as much as his birth and education, an object of uneasiness to them, and with him of a little Republic, towards which he had dared to shew some regard to justice and to the rights of nations. Thus they chose to throw a new and indelible stain of disgrace on their country, rather than in any way to relinquish their favourite scheme for the subversion and the ruin of Geneva.

Note (15), *p.* 19. The Citizen *Brissot*, in his report made on the 16th of October to the National Convention, in the name of the Diplomatic Committee, endeavours (by a partial and unfaithful quotation of the treaty of 1579) to prove that the meaning of that treaty was to protect Geneva, not for the advantage of Switzerland alone, but also and chiefly *for the advantage of France itself*, and in order to secure to this kingdom the facility of the passage through Geneva *whenever France might be in war either against Savoy or even against Switzerland.* To shew the falsehood of this pretension, it will be sufficient to present here the very words of the treaty which the Citizen *Brissot*, and his diplomatic associates, have carefully suppressed in their report. The very first lines of the treaty express, that the chief object of King Henry the Third of France,

(in

(in whose name it was concluded), was (*) " *(*le désirer & pour*
" *chasser tout ce qu'il estimeroit pouvoir servir à la conservation*
" *& sureté de l'Etat des Ligues Suisses.*" Et considerant, *est-il*
" *ajouté,* qu'il ne se pourroit faire aucune entreprise sur la moin-
" dre des places appartenantes ou alliées du corps en général
" des dites Ligues, ou en particulier d'aucuns Cantons d'icelles,
" *sans apporter quelque trouble à leur commune union & bonne in-*
" *telligence avec affoiblissement de leur dit Etat**). De tant plus si
" telle nouveauté advenoit par la surprise ou l'occupation de
" place de telle importance comme est la ville & cité de Ge-
" nève *(*alliée des Seigneurs de la Ville & Canton de Berne)*,
" pour être icelle Ville de Genève l'une des clefs & principal
" Boulevards du pays des Ligues, & qui peut tenir le passage
" libre & ouvert entre la dite Majesté & les dits Seigneurs des
" Ligues; & ayant entendu que pour obvier aux dites entre-
" prises & desseins qui se pourroient faire sur icelle, pour la
" surprendre & faire changer de mains; & par conséquent clore
" & interdire ce passage qui de tout tems à été libre entre les
" dits Rois de France & les Seigneurs des Ligues, (* les
" Seigneurs des Villes & Cantons de Berne & Soleure, etoient dé-
" libérés de faire entre eux quelque traité particulier pour la con-
" servation & defense d'icelle ville, *pour le bien & sureté com-*
" *mune de toutes les Ligues*; sa Majesté ayant été par eux requise
" d'y entrer, a estimé, à l'exemple de ses predecesseurs *qui ont*
" *toujours été très prompts d'embrasser tout ce qui s'est présenté pour*
" *le bien & repos des dites Ligues,* de ne les en devoir conduire;
" ainsi au contraire s'efforcer par tous moyens de rendre &
" tenir à jamais le dit passage libre & assuré, *au benefice & su-*
" *reté des pays, terres & seigneuries des dits Seigneurs des Ligues.*

" Pour

(*) The expressions contained between two parenthesis, and marked with an Asterisk, have been carefully suppressed by the Citizen Brissot.

" Pour à quoi parvenir, ſa Majeſté——auroit chargé, par let-
" tres patentes Meſſire Jean de Beliévre, Seigneur de Hautefort
" &c. de traiter & convenir avec les Cantons ou alliés des
" Seigneurs des Ligues en général ou en particulier, de tout ce
" qui pourroit ſervir *à la continuation & fortification du repos*
" *général d'icelles*, & ſpecialement à la conſervation de la Ville
" et Cité de Genève & du territoire d'icelle, en l'état qu'elle
" ſe trouve à preſent, & empêcher les entrepriſes qui ſe pour-
" roient faire ſur icelle *par quelques perſonnes ou Potentats que*
" *ce ſoit ſans nul excepter.*——Le dit Seigneur de Hautefort
" *déſirant ſatisfaire au déſir & affection que les Seigneurs des Villes*
" *& Cantons de Berne & de Soleure ont demontré avoir à la conſerva-*
" *tion de la Ville & Cité de Genève*, & à la requête qu'ils en ont
" faite à ſa Majeſté *au commun benefice, repos & ſureté de tous les*
" *Pays des Ligues*, ſeroit convenu des conditions ci-après de-
" clarées——EN PREMIER LIEU, que pour ſatisfaire à la re-
" quête des dits Seigneurs de Berne & de Soleure, & à l'opinion
" qu'ils ont *qu'il importe grandement à leur bien, repos & de tout*
" *le général des Ligues*—& *en faveur & contemplation des dits*
" *Seigneurs de Berne & de Soleure*, il a été accordé que la Ville
" & Cité de Genève, avec ſon territoire, ſera compriſe *au*
" *traité de paix perpétuelle qui eſt entre la Couronne de France &*
" *le Général des Ligues*, à la charge que les habitants d'icelle
" ſe comporteront envers ſa Majeſté & la Couronne de France,
" avec le reſpect qu'il appartient, & qui eſt porté par le dit traité
" de paix perpetuelle.")

The next article relates chiefly to the garriſon which the Swiſs Cantons might have occaſion to ſend to Geneva for the preſervation of that city, and whoſe pay was to be ſupported by the King of France. This point will be fully explained in the 17th Note.

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The following articles relate to the ſuccours to be reciprocally given, viz. *in ſubſidies* by the King of France to the Swiſs Cantons, and *in troops*, by theſe laſt to the King of France, in caſe that either of the contracting parties ſhould be involved in a war in conſequence of the treaty. Theſe clauſes are abſolutely foreign to the queſtion.

The laſt article, relating to the paſſage of the ſoldiers in the pay of France through Geneva, is thus ſtipulated: " Et pour " reconnoiſſance du bien que la Ville de Genève recevra du " Roi par le moyen de la dite defenſe & conſervation, les Su- " jets de ſa Majeſté auront ſur & libre accès en icelle, tant pour " le trafic, &c. que auſſi *pour le paſſage des gens de guerre,* " *qu'elle pourroit avoir à tirer des dites Ligues, ou à envoyer de* " *là des monts* (c'eſt à dire en Italie); leſquels gens de guerre, " paſſant à la file ſans déſordre, & avec toute modeſtie, ils ſe- " ront reçus & logés, & à eux adminiſtré vivres & autres " choſes néceſſaires en payant raiſonnablement, & ſeront, pour " cet effet, les Seigneurs de la dite ville premièrement avertis " du paſſage des dits gens de guerre, *attendu la qualité de la* " *dite ville*, à ce qu'ils ne ſoyent ſurpris ou ſurchargés."

From this general expoſition of the treaty of 1579 it is evident, 1ſt, That the object of the treaty was to preſerve and defend the city of Geneva as *a key and the chief bulwark of Switzerland againſt any power whatſoever*, and not as the Citizen *Briſſot* would inſinuate, to give the French a right in Geneva *which could be prejudicial to Switzerland.* 2dly, That the motives which induced the King of France to enter into this treaty were only the *requeſt made to him by the Cantons of Bern and Soleure*, and the opinion they were of, *that the preſervation of Geneva was greatly advantageous to them, and in general to the common conſervation, ſecurity, and good underſtanding of the whole*

Helvetic Confederacy. 3d, That the conſideration drawn from the liberty of paſſage through Geneva between France and Switzerland related only, according to the expreſſions of the treaty, to *the benefit and ſecurity of the countries, lands and lordſhips of the Swiſs Cantons;* as, in fact, by former treaties the Canton of Bern had a right to paſs troops through Geneva whenever it might be expedient. 4th, That the clauſe which extends that right to France could not be applied to the caſe where France would be at war againſt Switzerland; ſuch a meaning being in direct oppoſition to the very object of the treaty, which was to preſerve Geneva *as a key and chief bulwark to Switzerland againſt any power whatſoever*; and moreover, as that clauſe ſpeaks only of ſuch troops as would be drawn by France *from the Swiſs Cantons*, or of ſuch as would be ſent *to Italy.* 5th, That far from intending, by that treaty, to weaken or impair in any ways the ancient connections ſubſiſting between Geneva and the Swiſs Cantons, the King of France, on the contrary, expreſsly acknowledged thoſe connections, and gave them a new degree of ſtrength, by nominally including Geneva into the treaty of perpetual peace and union of the Swiſs Cantons with the crown of France. The effect of which comprehenſion was to ſettle Geneva, in regard to France, for ever, *as a part of, and an eſſential appendage to, Switzerland.* Theſe conſiderations, which are evident from the Letter of the treaty, were entirely diſregarded by the Citizen *Briſſot.* So anxious was that man to deſtroy the peace and happineſs of a little harmleſs Republic, to gratify a private ſhameful reſentment, that he did not mind how eaſy it would be, when this work of darkneſs and iniquity ſhould be conſummated, to detect his own villany in the face of Europe, by the mere production of the treaty which he had ſo wantonly falſified in his report.

Note

Note 16, *p.* 20. The Canton of Bern had been connected with Geneva, and bound to give this city every assistance she should stand in need of, even since the year 1526. The treaty made at that time between the three Republics of *Bern*, *Fribourg*, and *Geneva*, was renewed and confirmed between those of *Bern* and *Geneva* alone, in the years 1536 and 1548, and made *perpetual* in the year 1558. By this last treaty, which has never been annulled, the two Republics *received each other as true and perpetual co-burgesses, swearing solemnly to God Almighty, that they will be sincere and faithful to each other, and endeavour, to their utmost, to advance their mutual honour and advantage, to avert their mutual dangers, and to render to each other every good office which faithful burgesses reciprocally owe to themselves.* This treaty, which was reserved as late as the year 1738, in the transaction which took place at that time between France, the Cantons of Zurick and Bern, and Geneva, this same treaty, which imposes on both states the *duty of assisting each other in time of danger*, was not mentioned by the Citizen *Brissot* in his report to the National Convention. Had he taken any notice of it, he would have found that the treaty of 1579 was entered into, according to a special clause of that treaty of 1558, by which the Canton of Bern promised Geneva to procure her inclusion *in the treaty of perpetual peace with France*, and of course, that the ancient relations of Geneva, with the Helvetic Body, have been rather confirmed and strengthened, than any ways impaired by that treaty of 1579.

Note (17), *p.* 20. The very expressions of the treaty are perfectly apposite to that purpose: after having declared, that in case the Cantons of Bern and Soleure (and such other Cantons as should thereafter accede to the treaty), *had an occasion to put a garrison* in Geneva for her preservation, France should pay

the expence of it to the amount of 1500 men, it is added, " *Mais afin que l'on ne faſſe entrer le Roi en depens inutiles &* " *ſuperflus, pour la dite garniſon*, il a été accordé que, lorſqu'il " conviendra la mettre, la déliberation s'en fera avec l'Ambaſ- " ſadeur de ſa Majeſté en Suiſſe, *lequel y aura ſa voix, comme* " *un des Cantons* qui ſeront entrés dans ce traité; & ſera faite " la réſolution de bonne foi, *ſelon la pluralité des voix.*"

Whence it evidently follows, 1ſt, That the queſtion in that treaty was not concerning a ſuccour *demanded by the Geneveſe* (which was the object of their former treaty with Bern in the year 1558, and of the ſubſequent one of the year 1584 with the two Cantons of Zurick and Bern) but only concerning a *garriſon*, which the Cantons of Bern and Soleure, and that of Zurich, which did afterwards accede to the treaty, *might have occaſion to put into the city of Geneva.* 2dly, That the obligation of conſulting the French Ambaſſador did only exiſt in caſe *that the French ſubſidy ſhould be demanded.* 3dly, That ſuch a conſultation was not to be made by the Geneveſe, but by the Cantons themſelves, who *ſhould have occaſion to ſend a garriſon there*; and that accordingly it was abſurd to ſay, that, by not conſulting the French, the Geneveſe had infringed the treaty. 4th, That *a conſultation* being not at all ſynonymous with *a conſent*, and the French Ambaſſador having only one vote in a Congreſs where every thing was to be decided *according to the plurality of votes*, had the conſultation taken place, the French would have been, according to the treaty, obliged to furniſh the expences of the Swiſs garriſon in Geneva, however unwilling they had been to that meaſure. It was furthermore enacted in the treaty, that *in caſe of any difficulty ariſing in reſpect to the ſaid garriſon*, it ſhould be ſettled *amicably by way of umpires, agreeable to the treaty of perpetual union*

of

of 1516. All thoſe clauſes of the treaty, which would have ſo plainly ſhewn the *injuſtice*, as well as the *barbarity*, of the military preparations made againſt Geneva, were carefully kept from the knowledge of the National Convention by their worthy reporters.

Note (18), *p.* 21. The Geneveſe have many precedents of ſimilar circumſtances in which they have received the ſuccours ſtipulated by the treaty of 1584, without conſulting France, and without ever being accuſed of it, either as a breach of treaties or as an offence. The moſt pointed ones are when Louis XIV. invaded Savoy in 1686, 1688, 1690, and 1691, in which laſt occaſion the Swiſs garriſon of Zurick and Bern was kept in Geneva till the year 1697. This demonſtrates, how the Miniſter *Claviere* did miſlead General *Monteſquiou* when he wrote to him, on the 11th of October 1792, *there is not an inſtance of the Swiſs troops having ever been called to aſſiſt Geneva againſt France.*

Another precedent, more recent, and no leſs particularly in point, is that of the year 1743, when the Spaniards, in concert and with the conſent of France, occupied Savoy.—On this laſt occaſion, the Citizen *Briſſot* pretends to aſſert, that the minority of voters, who in the General Council of Geneva, in 1743, rejected the propoſal of calling the Swiſs troops, were induced to do it, *becauſe France had not been conſulted, as ſhe ought to have been, according to the treaty of* 1579. This is a notorious falſehood; every one knows in Geneva, that thoſe who at that time were averſe to the appeal of the Swiſs troops, had no idea of demanding that France ſhould be conſulted; they dreaded for their liberty, the influence of a force which, in the beginning of this century, had been applied to ſecond the oppreſſive views of government. It is to this only motive that

one may fairly attribute the diverſity of opinion on that account both in 1743 and in 1792.

Note (19), *p.* 21. It is remarkable, that the National Convention was never allowed to hear, peaceably, a ſingle word in favour of Geneva during this long conteſt;—that when the letter of the Magiſtrates of Geneva of the 10th of October to the Miniſter *Le Brun* was brought to the National Convention, the reading of it was interrupted by a decree made on the motion of the Citizen *La Source*, by which the *National Convention, giving no more attention to the* LIBELL *of the Magnifique Conſeil of Geneva, do paſs to the order of the day*; (Journal des Debats & Decrets, No. 28.)—That ſeveral memorials, or letters directed to the Miniſter *Le Brun*, to the Miniſter *Clavière*, to Mr. *de Condorcet*, and others, either fromGeneva or from London, (by which the right of the Geneveſe, and the falſehood of the allegations of the French diplomatic leaders were demonſtrated) were never read to the Convention; and that while, according to the French *freedom of ſpeech*, nobody was permitted to ſpeak or to read any thing in favour of the Geneveſe, the French leaders, through their boaſted *freedom of the preſs*, moſt aſſiduouſly reſtrained any publication, or any paragraph in the news papers, by which a true and correct ſtatement either of the point of right, or of the facts, might be conveyed to the public. What was the object of all thoſe abſurd and tyrannical precautions? It was in order that the Citizen *Briſſot*, in the name of the Diplomatic Committee, might, without either controul or uneaſineſs, develope in his report to the National Convention, all the miſconſtructions, all the fallacious arguments, all the falſehoods which he had digeſted, with a view to raiſe an univerſal outcry of *ariſtocracy* againſt Geneva; and, of courſe, to excite againſt her a deep ſenſe of reſentment, which could never be appeaſed

peaſed but by the total ſubverſion and Jacobinization of that little and devoted Republic.

Note (20), *p.* 22. Thoſe expreſſions are the only arguments employed by the Citizen Briſſot in his report to the National Convention, made the 16th of October, in the name of the Diplomatic Committee, which are grounded either on abſolute falſhood, or on the moſt flagrant miſrepreſentation of facts, or on the voluntary concealment of the moſt important clauſes of the exiſting treaties. Thus it is, that this great apoſtle for liberty, for humanity, for juſtice, propagates his doctrine, by inſidiouſly attacking (in an Aſſembly where he is aſſured that nobody would dare to oppoſe his calumniating aſſertions) a ſmall State, the only one in Europe which had a *written* Democracy, and which, through the purity of its morals, and the wiſdom of its conſtitutional forms, had conſtantly proved the poſſibility of uniting liberty with public order.

Note (21), *p.* 23. The abolition of the the Act of Guarantee of 1782, propoſed by the Citizen *Briſſot* on the 16th of October, was a neceſſary conſequence of his plans. By this act, *in caſe of any riot or inſurrection ariſing in Geneva, and which the legal Government could not repreſs*, the guaranteeing powers were bound to *interfere in concert for the reſtoration of the public order*; but as it was the intention of the citizens *Briſſot* and *Claviere*, and of their aſſociates, to employ the very mode of *an inſurrection* to procure a total change in the laws and conſtitution of the Republic, and to ſupport it, if neceſſary, by keeping a French army in the neighbourhood, it is plain enough that, according to this plan, the act of guarantee could not be allowed to ſubſiſt any longer. They then propoſed to annul it, reſerving to themſelves, when once they ſhould be free from that impediment, to employ the foulеſt means of intrigue and corruption to miſlead

the

the minds of the people, and throw them into diſorganiſation and anarchy. Thoſe ſecret views of the French were laid open in the ſitting of the 16th of October, by the citizen *Guadet*, as may be ſeen in the *Journal des Decrets*, No. 27, p. 505.

Note (22), *p.* 23. This firſt treaty, (ſigned on the 22d of October,) was prefaced with a preamble, expreſſive of the motives which had hitherto actuated both parties in their conduct towards each other; an expoſition, equally honourable to France and to Geneva, and by which every idea of the great State, intending to abuſe of its force to oppreſs the little one, and of this laſt, having meant any hoſtility to the former, was moſt nobly and moſt ſolemnly deprecated. The articles were congenial to, and the neceſſary conſequence of, the preamble.

By the *firſt*, the retreat of the Swiſs troops from Geneva was to commence immediately, and to be completed on the 1ſt of December next.

By the *ſecond*, the French, on their ſide, were to ſend back immediately, to their fortified towns, all the heavy artillery they had brought thither to beſiege Geneva, and to withdraw the main body of their army to the diſtance of ten leagues from Geneva, excepting only ſuch detachments as would be neceſſary for the preſervation of the police and good order in the neighbourhood; the ſaid retreat to be completed on the 1ſt of December.

The *third* article related to the reſtoration of a free intercourſe between the contracting parties, and to the renewal of the communication between Geneva and Switzerland.

By the *fourth*, the Reſident of France was to return to Geneva, and to reaſſume his ſtation.

By the *fifth*, all the treaties of the Republic of Geneva with her neighbours, and eſpecially that of 1584, with the Cantons of

Zurick

Zurick and Bern, together with the 5th article of the treaty of 1782, were reſerved.

In the ſixth article was a ſtipulation about the term of the exchanging of the ratifications.

As the *preamble* contained only *words* and *principles*, of which the French leaders are uſually very bountiful, it met with a complete and general approbation in the Executive Council.

The *firſt* article, being on the part of the Geneveſe, a renunciation of the actual exerciſe of their undoubted right, was alſo approved of.

But the *ſecond*, by which a neceſſary compenſation for that ſacrifice was ſtipulated on the ſide of the French, was objected to, as too explicit. And, in fact, it was too much ſo for the accompliſhment of the ſecret deſigns of the French leaders, with regard to the revolution they intended to operate in Geneva.

The *third* and *ſixth* articles met with no objection.

The *fourth* was objected to, as unneceſſary.

As likewiſe was the *fifth*, though it only contained the reſervation of thoſe treaties, which the French had ſo falſely accuſed the Geneveſe of having infringed. An objection, which evidently demonſtrated the *inſincerity* of the accuſation on the part of the French.

Note (23), *p.* 24. By the ſecond treaty, made on the 2d of November, both the *preamble*, the *firſt*, the *third*, and the *fifth* articles of the firſt treaty were *preſerved*. The *ſecond* article was ſo *altered*, as not to be ſo explicit as it was before, in reſpect to the diſtance where the French troops and heavy artillery were to retire. The *fourth* article, concerning the French Reſident, was *annulled*; and the *fifth* one was worded in ſuch a manner, as not to indicate any acknowledgment of the treaties, on the part of the French, which the Geneveſe wiſhed to reſerve. It

contained beſides a *ſalvo* in favour of the French nation, whereby they might reviſe their treaties whenever they ſhould think proper, and likewiſe a declaration that, till ſuch a reviſion ſhould take place, they intended to obſerve them religiouſly. This ſecond treaty was ſigned, like the firſt, by General *Monteſquiou* on the part of France, and by Meſſrs *Prevoſt*, Privy Counſellor, and *Lullin*, Counſellor of the Great Council. Mr. *d'Ivernois*, newly elected a member of this laſt Council, and who had acted in the firſt treaty only as Secretary to the Legation, was deſired to ſign the ſecond treaty, with the above two gentlemen, as *joint Plenipotentiary*.

Note (23), *p.* 27. A majority of 956 to 534.

Note (24), *p.* 29. The following is a literal tranſlation of the reſolution, entered into by the Syndics and Council of Geneva, on the 7th of November, a copy of which was given to the citizen *Geneſt*: "Though in the Sovereign Council of Geneva the "votes are given in ſecret, and in ſuch a manner as to free the "voters from any other influence, but that of their oaths and of "their conſciences, and though this conſideration be fully ſuffi-"cient to remove the odious ſuſpicions, which have been at-"tempted to be thrown on the Government of Geneva; the "Council, however, thinking itſelf bound in duty to remove "even the ſmalleſt pretext to ſuch ſuſpicions, by every means "compatible with the independence of the Republic, and con-"ſidering that the draught of the law, which is to be ſubmitted "on the 8th of November to the Sovereign Council, reſerves to "the Little Council the power of executing it when it judges it "proper, Reſolve, that if the ſaid law be ſanctioned, it ſhall not "be carried into execution till the ſaid law has been confirmed "by the Sovereign Council, after the departure of the Swiſs "troops.

Note

Note (25), *p.* 30. It may be ſeen, by the *Juſtificative Memorial* of General *Monteſquiou*, how it happened that a decree of accuſation was ſo launched againſt the very firſt General, who had carried the French army into a foreign country. The motive of this decree was notoriouſly to gratify the paſſions of the enemies of Geneva, who, deſpairing to engage that General in their wicked ſchemes, had reſolved on his deſtruction. The calumniatory pamphlets, diſtributed in his army, and which were honourably conſigned in thoſe annals of licentiouſneſs and defamation the French call *newſpapers*;—the letters, written by thoſe very men, both to the Geneveſe levellers and to the army, announcing his deſtitution ſeveral days before it took place; and, above all, the very report of the citizen *Rovere*, offer at every line a material proof of this truth, that General *Monteſquiou*'s diſgrace had no other cauſe, than his non-compliance with the wiſhes of thoſe who wanted to plunge Genev into the horror of anarchy.

Note (26), *p.* 30. Any perſon, who has heard of the frequent and groſs abuſes laviſhed by the French ſcribblers on the Magiſtrates of Geneva, for having (according to treaties, and to a conſtant and reciprocal uſage) delivered to their allies of Bern one of the ſubjects of this laſt Republic, called *Reymondin*, who was convicted, upon his own confeſſion, of having ſent, to be diſſeminated in the *Pays de Vaud*, a printed exhortation in verſe, to murder and aſſaſſinate the Magiſtrates of Bern, will perhaps wonder at hearing that the ſame men afterwards ſo imperiouſly demanded the Geneveſe Magiſtrates to deliver up that very General, to whoſe manlineſs and virtue Geneva was, in this critical occurrence, indebted for her preſervation. Such are the uſual contradictions of that ſet of unprincipled men who have uſurped the authority over the French nation. Knowing of no

other rule of morality but the actual gratification of their unbounded paſſion, they are ever at variance, both in their ſpeeches, in their decrees, and in their acts, according to the verſatile impulſe of their whim, the exigencies of ſelf-intereſt, or the ſudden dictates of a momentary convenience; changing, at every inſtant, their line of conduct, as quickly as the cameleon catches his colours, they alternately diſtribute to the ſame acts their blame and their applauſe. With ſuch men indeed blame is an encomium, and applauſe a diſgrace.

With a ſenſe of pride for my country, I muſt here relate a fact, which ſhews how far the Geneveſe are from ſharing in that manner of acting of the French leaders. Since the appointment of the *two Proviſional Committees*, by which the whole power of the city appeared to have been transferred to the inſurgents, ſome few fanatics amongſt theſe laſt, inſtigated by *Grenus* and by the French emiſſaries, made a propoſal to ſeize on the property of the *Syndic Naville*, (who, being *Lieutenant de Police*, in the year 1791, had, by order of his ſuperiors, arreſted *Reymondin*, and delivered him up to the Canton of *Bern*) till he had obtained, from the Magiſtrates of that Republic, the enlargement of that unfortunate young man. This propoſal, (though powerfully countenanced by popular prejudices, and apparently grounded on a ſenſe of commiſeration for one who, in all likelihood, had been rather guilty of an imprudence than of an intentional treaſon to his ſovereign), was, with the utmoſt indignation, rejected as unjuſt and immoral. And I have no doubt but the demand made by the French agents of a ſearch being made after General *Monteſquiou*, in a caſe which was far from being ſo favourable to ſuch a requiſition, contributed very much to open the eyes of thoſe who, through an ill-applied ſenſe of humanity, had ſo ſeverely blamed the Magiſtrates of Geneva for their conduct in regard to *Reymondin*.

Not

Note (27), *p.* 31. This affectation of the French leaders, to deny an expreſs ratification of the Genevean treaty, will appear the leſs extraordinary when, by the facts related in this work, one will have dived into their ſecret deſigns. In their intention of overturning the old and venerable fabric of Conſtitution eſtabliſhed in Geneva, they would have felt themſelves in ſome way ſtopped by their own act, had they, by a formal ratification of treaty, acknowledged the ſovereignty of the General Council of the citizens, and conſented to treat with him: they then thought it better to leave it out, *to paſs to the order of the day* on that treaty; as if any thing, ſuch as a treaty between two countries, whatever may be the diſproportion of their forces, was to be treated with ſuch a contempt. Thus they choſe to dictate by a decree, revocable at their pleaſure, rather than to promiſe by a treaty, which, being the firſt they had made ſince their acceſſion to power, could not be broken through without ſome inconvenience to themſelves.

Note (28), *p.* 33. Such a ſpeech could hardly be believed, were it not literally extracted from the *Moniteur* of the 11th of November 1792. It was in the raptures of the ſatisfaction ſo juſtly excited by a piece of rhetoric ſo congenial to their ſentiments, that the National Convention voted a decree of accuſation againſt General *Monteſquiou*. This General relates another inſtance of *Dubois Crance*'s ſoftneſs of temper, and ſoundneſs of underſtanding: *If I were you*, ſaid he to the General, *I would throw Geneva into the lake, and afterwards I would invite the Swiſs to fiſh it out.* Theſe gentle expedients are particularly familiar to the French leaders: According to General *Monteſquiou*'s letter to the citizen *Vergniaud*, of the 7th of November, the Miniſter *Claviere* wrote to the ſame General, immediately after his arrival into Savoy, in theſe terms: *I hope you will ſoon enter*

enter into Geneva: you muſt deſtroy that neſt of Ariſtocrats; and fiſh out from it the treaſures we have therein buried. Whoever reads theſe lines, will feel as if he were in Gil Blas's cavern of robbers; for this laſt ſpeculation of French financeering could not be realized but by one of theſe two means, either plundering the city, or unmercifully butchering about two hundred young ladies, on whoſe heads that part of the French life annuities, which belong to Geneva and Switzerland, is placed. We muſt however obſerve, that this quotation relates to one of thoſe letters the Miniſter *Claviere* has omitted in publiſhing his *correſpondence* with General *Monteſquiou*, and that we have, till now, no other voucher of its truth but the General's own aſſertion in a letter, written to one of the chief members of the National Convention, about ten days before the decree of accuſation had been launched againſt him.

Note (29), *p.* 35. As ſoon as the decree of the 19th of November was known in Geneva, the levellers began to wear the red cap in their clubs, and to make every preparation for an inſurrection. On the 25th, it appears that ſome of them intended to riſe in revolt; but having been quelled by the firmneſs and activity of the citizens, they eſtabliſhed amongſt themſelves a kind of clubocratic government, of which the *Cercle de l'Egalité* was the center and director. In conſequence of an order of this club, the Miniſter *Anſpach*, one of the moſt implicit admirers of the French principles, drew up ſome articles of Conſtitution, which *he had*, he ſaid, *concatinated in a logical order*, and which were approved of by the levellers, as the glorious foundation of the regeneration of their country. I beg leave to preſent them here, with a ſhort commentary.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER I.

BASIS OF CONSTITUTION.

1. *All thoſe who are born in Geneva, or in its territory, are Citizens of Geneva.*

This article, conſidering the ſituation of Geneva, between four different countries, and on the great travelling road from France and Italy to Swizerland, Germany, and the North of Europe, is of the moſt conſummated abſurdity; were it admitted, it would depend on every poor inhabitant of the neighbouring diſtricts of France or Savoy, to give his children the rights of citizenſhip in Geneva, by ſending their wives to lay in ſomewhere in its territory; and of courſe every *Popiſh, Jew, Gipſey*, or other *beggar woman* who, on her wandering travels, might happen to paſs through Geneva, and to lay in there, would give birth to a *Citizen*.—The Miniſter *Anſpach* has forgot to provide bread and other neceſſaries for all thoſe new created citizens. He knows by experience that public charity was never defective towards the families of the poor in Geneva. But does he think that this could ſubſiſt, when the charge would grow ſo heavy and burthenſome, and when, to the fifth part of the real natives, who are uſually reared in that way, one would have added, by an immediate effect of his propoſed law, that numerous tribe of aliens, whom foreign mothers would, on purpoſe, come and beget in Geneva, that they may be educated and ſupported as citizens, and at the public expence? Can any thing put in a truer light the nonſenſe of thoſe theoretic and ſhort-ſighted reformers, who, unable to ſee beyond their own ſyſtem, are always ready to ſacrifice their country to ſome falſe notion of philanthropy, and their fellow citizens to foreigners?

2. *To fix a mode of adoption to the rights of citizenſhip for foreigners, who will be judged worthy of obtaining them.*—This is needleſs, conſidering the 4th article.

3. *The nation, that is to ſay, the aſſemblage of all thoſe who exerciſe the rights of citizenſhip, either by birth or by adoption, is the* SOVEREIGN.—What! without either legal convocation, previous deliberation, or form of preſidence, the people at large may aſſemble at any time, in any place, and exerciſe their ſovereignty! Is this any thing elſe but that true Jacobiniſtical ſovereignty, which, to the ſhame and for the unhappineſs of France, was exerciſed on the 10th of Auguſt and 2d of September laſt?

Will you ſay that the ſovereignty exiſts only, when *all the Citizens* are aſſembled? But then it will depend on the caprice of every ſingle individual, that there may be neither ſovereign nor ſovereignty. What nonſenſe!

4. *Every admiſſion to the rights of citizenſhip ſhall depend immediately on the Sovereign.*—So that, whenever any foreigner will require to be admitted as a citizen, the nation at large, who knows nothing of him, muſt convene immediately, and decide on his admiſſion.

5. *The Sovereign is the ſource of all powers. It may, at any time delegate and revoke them.* Vide article the 3d.—A fine contrivance indeed, for every people, and more eſpecially for a people of merchants, manufacturers, and artiſts, that they may aſſemble by themſelves at any time, and *revoke*, at one day, the very *ſame power* they have *created* the day before!

6. *Separation of powers.*—How can the powers be *ſeparated*, when it depends only on a popular caprice to *delegate and revoke them* at pleaſure?

7. *The public functionaries have neither attributions nor rights, but only duties and powers to fulfil them.*—This it utterly unintelligible. If the powers are to be *ſeparated*, muſt not a certain Magiſtrate have a diſtinct *attribution* from another? If he has the

power of commanding in certain cafes, has he not, in thofe fame cafes, the *right* of enforcing obedience?

8. *The amovability and refponfability of all public functionaries.*—This is needlefs, fince, *at any time*, the people at large may *revoke* all public functionaries, by exerting their fovereignty.

9. *Eftablifhment of public proceedings by juries, to fecure the individual liberty.*—It is generally acknowledged that, in an extenfive diftrict, where the jurymen are abfolutely unconnected with parties, the trial by jury has an evident tendency to fecure both individual liberty and public tranquillity. But this would be very doubtful in a fingle town, of a narrow compafs, where all individuals are more or lefs connected with each other, where both private affections and public paffions may fo often affect their judgment, and where, of courfe, it may fo eafily happen, that fuch an inftitution might have the moft mifchievous effects on the liberty of individuals, and on public harmony. This confideration is a mere trifle to thofe fpeculative minds, who always judge of a political inftitution from what they call the *grand and general principles*, and who think themfelves entitled to legiflate for the whole world, becaufe making a perpetual abftraction of circumftances, they never have a regard to the fituation, the extent, the number, and the peculiar character of the people to whom they intend to apply their philofophical dreams.

10. *A quinquennial revifion of all taxes, by a Committee ad hoc, elected by the Sovereign, to whom they are to report their work.*—This revifion may be fuitable, and even neceffary, in a country where the taxes are impofed by a repref entative body; but in a fmall Republic, where the people at large are themfelves to vote on the fubject, fuch a revifion for that part of taxes at leaft, which are abfolutely neceffary for the defraying of the public ordinary expences, would be a highway to anarchy, and

a periodical occaſion of diſcord and confuſion amongſt the citizens.

11. *The right of petition to every Citizen, with a ſpeedy deciſion on them by the Sovereign.*—By this article it would depend on the caprice of every ſingle individual to call together the aſſemblage of all his fellow citizens, to know their intention on whatever ſubject he might, in his whim, think fit to propoſe.

12. *All the Citizens to be ſoldiers, under an uniform management.*—So that, without any diſtinction between the old and the young, the maimed and the ſound, the valetudinarian and the healthy, the layman and the churchman, the Magiſtrate and the people, every one is to be a ſoldier, and obliged to carry arms!

13. *National education.*—Of this nothing can be ſaid, till we know what Miniſter *Anſpach* means by *education.*

CHAPTER II.

PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS RELATING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.

1. *To fix a mode of adoption to the rights of citizenſhip, for the inhabitants and the foreigners living actually in Geneva.*—It is obvious, that this article was one of the deareſt objects of the levellers, by the facility it gave them to encreaſe their numbers, and with a legion of foreigners to overcome the real and ancient citizens.

2. *An abſolute freedom in point of religion, ſo that the diverſity of opinions, in this reſpect, be no impediment to the exerciſe of the rights of citizenſhip.*—This article was, along with the others, propoſed by the Miniſter *Anſpach*, and generally approved of by the moſt fanatics of the party; but ſo conſcious were the leaders of the indignation it would excite in a city who is indebted for her liberty to her conſtant regard and adherence to the proteſtant creed, that

that they thought proper to paſs it by in the printed copy of theſe propoſals. It is, however, eaſy to ſee, by the complexion of the firſt article of the firſt chapter, what was, in this reſpect, their real intention.

3. *An indefinite freedom of the preſs.*—So that, ad inſtar of the French, every calumny or abuſe, every kind of injury may be done to individuals, every profanation committed, every kind of public or private crime may be adviſed, abetted, or excited, provided it be done in type, and under the ſanction of a printing preſs.

4. *A change in the ſyſtem of taxation, ſo that all thoſe taxes which are impoſed on neceſſaries be ſuppreſſed.*—By combining this article with the firſt chapter, it is evident, that the intention of our *ſelf-created Lycurgus* was, in a city which ſubſiſts only upon trade, manufactures, and the capital ſtock of the wealthy, to throw all the weight and the power in the hands of thoſe who have neither fortune nor induſtry, and who, of courſe, cannot, either directly or indirectly, contribute to the public expences. Before ſuch a ſcheme be approved of, we have a right to expect from the Reverend propoſer, that he will ſhew, how it is reconcileable to juſtice, to morality, to ſound policy, and even to the true and real advantage of thoſe, in behalf of whom it appears to have been propoſed.

5. *The ſuppreſſion of the garriſon.*—The effect of this article is obviouſly both to weaken the civil power, to give up the city to the firſt foreign invader, or to oblige all citizens continually to quit their reſpective avocations, in order to protect their outward independence, their liberty, their laws, their properties, and to maintain the police, and the public order and tranquillity.

6. *Annihilation of all judgments on political matters in this century, and an expreſs and nominal re-integration of the memory of*

those who have been condemned by them.—Whatever might have been the partialities, or even the injuſtices, committed in certain particular former circumſtances, by the judicial power, it would be hard indeed to demonſtrate, that ſuch an article as this was an indiſpenſible preliminary to a good and wiſe ſyſtem of Government.

Such were the baſis of Conſtitution the chief of the levellers propoſed to their affiliates; ſuch is the end which they appear to have had in view in their different inſurrections. It is to eſtabliſh ſuch a regular and miſchievous anarchy, that they have taken arms, five or ſix times in two months, againſt their fellow citizens, overturned by force the ancient laws of the city, uſurped every kind of power; that they intended to devote one of the principal churches to the ſittings of a *National Aſſembly*; to convert their theatre into a *Jacobine Club*, and that, unleſs they obtained a full and unreſerved compliance, the moſt fanatics of them continually threaten of opening the gates of the city to the French.

Note (30), *p.* 40. We do not attribute this intention to all the levellers, but only to thoſe of their chiefs who had the greateſt influence amongſt them. It was evidently to that purpoſe, that the firſt baſis of Conſtitution, mentioned in the preceding note, were directed, and that the Miniſter *Anſpach* held out, that four proteſtant Miniſters were fully ſufficient for the religious ſervice in Geneva. No doubt, indeed, but that even this laſt number would have been very ſoon conſidered as *ſuperfluous*, had not the whole bulk of the Geneveſe openly reſiſted ſuch a dangerous inſinuation. But ſuch is the ſtrength of the principles of the Geneveſe, in regard to their religious tenets, that this ſcheme, however favourable to the levelling ſyſtem, could never be underſtood, even by the majority of the inſurgents themſelves,

ſelves, and that they as conſtantly adhered to their proteſtant form of worſhip, as to the external independence of the ſtate.

One undeniable proof of this adherence is to be found in the firſt chapter of thoſe demands of theirs (ſee above p. 45), which the levellers got approved of, by force of arms, in the Sovereign Council, on the 12th of December, where they lay down the being a proteſtant as an indiſpenſible quality for foreigners to be admitted amongſt the citizens.

Note (31), *p.* 41. It is notorious that, on the very day of the inſurrection, the ſeveral French corps, cantoned in the neighbourhood of Geneva, were under orders to keep themſelves ready to march at the firſt command. This fact alone would be ſufficient to clear M. *Michely*, the *Syndic de la Garde*, from any reproach, in regard to the reſolution he took of complying with the demands of the inſurgents; even when his perſonal character, his manlineſs, and known attachment to his country would not, as it does, render him quite ſuperior to any unfavourable ſuſpicion on this ſubject.

Note (32), *p.* 43. This ſpeech of the French Reſident, together with all the formalities attending on his viſit to the Committee of the inſurgents, may be ſeen in a letter from Geneva, dated December 15th, *in the firſt year of the Geneveſe Equality*, printed in the *Gazette Nationale de France* of the 3d of January 1793.

Such an inſtance of French Jacobine faith will fully ſhew, what a degree of credit Neutral ſtates were to grant to the ſeveral explanations given by the Executive Power of France, to the abſurd decree of the Convention of the 19th of November. According to thoſe explanations, tranſmitted both to England and to the Helvetic body, "The French promiſe fraternity and ſup-
"port *only* to ſuch people as would ſhake off the yoke of thoſe
"Princes

" Princes *with whom* their Republic *is at war.* But, ſay they, " this cannot be applied to a *neutral people*, who had *freely ac-* " *cepted* the Conſtitution he is ſubmitted to; would a portion of " ſuch a people riſe to inſurrection, and break the compact " which unites them to the ſocial body, of which they are only " a part, vainly would they depend on our aſſiſtance; we would " ſee in the project of ſuch people nothing but a partial wiſh, in " oppoſition to the general will; their inſurrection would be, " to our eyes, nothing but a ſedition, in which we would in no " ways be concerned."

On theſe explanations which, to ſome perſons, have appeared a ſufficient ſatisfaction for the injury offered by the decree of the 19th of November, to all the Neutral ſtates, I beg leave to obſerve:

1ſt. That the diſtinction, made by the French Miniſters between the *neutral ſtates* and the *belligerent powers*, as derived from the decree itſelf, was ſo far from exiſting in the intention of the National Convention, that, in fact, this decree was propoſed and paſſed on account of an inſurrection which had happened in ſome villages of a neutral ſtate *(the Duchy of Deuxponts)* when at that time a French Reſident was in the full exerciſe of his functions [ſee the whole of this tranſaction in the Journal des Decrets, No. 61.]

2dly. That this very diſtinction was propoſed to the National Convention by one of its members, in one of the following ſittings, as a proper and neceſſary amendment to be made to the decree of the 19th, and *expreſsly rejected* by the order of the day; and that, of courſe, whatever the French Miniſters or the French Executive Council may ſay on the occaſion, is of no avail, as, by the French Conſtitution, neither of them has a right to interpret, explain, or in any ways to correct the decrees of the Convention.

3dly. That, even admitting this diſtinction, and the whole of the miniſterial explanations to be the true and ſincere meaning of the decree, the evident tendency of ſuch a principle once admitted in the laws of nations, would be to annihilate the independence of all the European ſtates, and to make France the controuler of their deareſt internal concerns, and the ſovereign judge of their reſpective Conſtitutions; for, in fact, at every commotion which Jacobine intrigue would excite in any ſtate, France would have to decide, 1ſt, Whether it is the *people at large* who *riſe*, or only a *portion of the people* who *rebel* againſt the general will; 2dly, whether the inſurgent people had *freely accepted* the Conſtitution, which they wiſh to deſtroy, or whether they had been *forced to ſubmit to it*. And ſince, according to the French principles, a people may, at any time, *change their conſtitution*, it is pretty obvious that, even had the *primitive conſent* been *free*, the very fact of the inſurrection would render it the *work of force*, and that, of courſe, every attempt of any portion of a people againſt the laws to which they had once ſubmitted, would be liable to be countenanced by the French in any country where, by ſuch ſupport, they could flatter themſelves to make that attempt ſucceſsful.

That ſuch was, in fact, the intention and the real ſyſtem of the French, their conduct with reſpect to Geneva will appear to be a demonſtrative proof. Geneva was a *Neutral* State, acknowledged as ſuch by the National Convention itſelf. Her laws had been *freely* accepted. The *portion of the people* who did riſe againſt theſe laws was, comparatively to the reſt of the Geneveſe, *very inconſiderable*; and, notwithſtanding all theſe circumſtances, the decree of the 19th of November, has had, in their favour, its full and complete effect.

Note

Note (33), *p.* 43. On the 7th of December a number of French ſoldiers having appeared before the gates of the city, without paſſes from their Commanders, admittance was refuſed to them by order of the Syndic de la Garde; and as they were hourly increaſing, that Magiſtrate ordered the gates of the city to be kept ſhut, and the artillery to be brought on the ramparts; but the Committee of the Inſurgents countermanded theſe orders; and in conſequence of this the French ſoldiers were admitted. About 2000 of them came that day, and afterwards returned to their quarters. From that time, Geneva and its territory have been conſtantly open to their paſſage, even without thoſe uſual formalities, which a due regard to the independence of the Republic ought to have engaged the Committees to maintain inviolable; but in this point they were evidently influenced by the fear of diſpleaſing either thoſe who were the greateſt fanatics amongſt the inſurgents, or the French volunteers themſelves, who, being uſed to elect and revoke their officers, cannot be poſſibly kept within the neceſſary bounds of diſcipline and ſubordination. It is eaſy to conceive how far that frequent and mutual intercourſe with ſuch men, and their ſpeeches, muſt have increaſed the audacity of the one party, and the cautiouſneſs and forbearance of the other.

Note (34), *p.* 44. This circumſtance is remarkable, and ſhews plainly what a ſtrong and natural oppoſition there is between a rational and well grounded attachment for true liberty, and thoſe licentious and miſchievous principles, which the deluded French have in their delirium miſtaken for it.

I muſt, however, confeſs, that the *tree of liberty* has been at laſt erected within the *Quartier de St. Gervais*, on the day of the firſt ſitting of the Geneveſe National Aſſembly: but the manner in which it was done, will more and more demonſtrate how heartily diſpleaſed were the inhabitants of that part of the city, and indeed

the

the generality of the citizens, with that ſervile and nonſenſical imitation of French ceremonies; for out of the whole Geneveſe Legion, who were commanded to appear in regimentals on this day, the inſurgents could hardly collect above three hundred of them; the reſt abſented voluntarily out of the city on that very day; and when the French Secretary of Legation, between the two Preſidents of the Committees, and the National Aſſembly, went in proceſſion to the ſpot, inſtead of the concourſe of people and the univerſal ſhouts of applauſe they expected on their paſſage, they found the windows ſhut, the moſt populous ſtreets almoſt converted into deſarts, and only a parcel of Geneveſe and French *Sans Culottes* endeavouring, by their noiſe and clamours, to make amends for the univerſal bluſh and indignation of the true citizens.

Note (35), *p.* 49. Thoſe who know perſonally the citizens of Geneva, will readily acknowledge this truth, that neither of the perſons here alluded to, nor indeed the *greateſt majority* of the members who now compoſe the *National Aſſembly*, the *two Proviſional Committees*, or even the club called the *Cercle de l'Egalité*, had harboured any wiſh of, or formed any plan for uniting Geneva to France, or adopting the French anarchical form of conſtitution. They have been inſenſibly led to diſſatisfaction, firſt, by the above related cauſes, and afterwards by this diſpoſition, too common in Geneva, and indeed every where amongſt oppoſite parties, to attribute to one another a deeper policy and more extenſive views, than thoſe which they have in reality. Hence ſprings a kind of eſtrangement between men and men, which keeps them at a diſtance from one another, and prevents any explanation; this eſtrangement encreaſes the mutual diſtruſt; this diſtruſt calls from every ſide for ſtrong precautions; which, though originally and intentionally defenſive and juſti-

 fiable,

fiable, are nevertheleſs ſuppoſed offenſive and criminal by thoſe againſt whom they appear to be directed. Such was, undoubtedly, the origin of that *Coalition of Clubs* we have already ſpoken of, which, though very patriotic and upright in its object, has daily turned ſo effectual towards apparently dividing the Republic into two parties, at a time when the moſt common prudence required that all party diſtinction ſhould be carefully expunged, and which, to the mildeſt and freeſt government on earth, gave a look of partiality and oppreſſion, by ſuggeſting to it many little impolitic meaſures and trifling proſecutions, which it would have been ſo wiſe, and indeed ſo eaſy to abſtain from, without endangering the public ſafety. This muſt ſhew to the Geneveſe, that it is not by force that any form of government can ever be maintained in ſuch a confined commonwealth; but by perſuaſion, by reciprocal confidence, by a general and complete union between both the Magiſtrates and the people, and by ſimilar inſtitutions to thoſe which had been propoſed, in order to procure this great and ſalutary effect, and of which the experience of ſeveral Cantons of Switzerland has, for ages paſt, proved the wiſdom.

Note (36), *p.* 50. The *Department of the Mont Blanc* is the new name given to *Savoy* by the French, at the time of the incorporation of that Duchy to their Republic. Had *Geneva* yielded to their inſinuations, together with the *Pays de Vaud* and the *Vallais*, it is very likely that theſe countries, and that part of Savoy round the Lake of Geneva, would have formed a new Department under the name of *Lake Leman*.—*Grenus* was not the only miſſionary who preached this doctrine to the Geneveſe; many French officers, and amongſt them the citizen *Comite*, going from club to club, and in every public place, endeavoured to propagate the ſame; but to no purpoſe. So unpopular was it, even

even to the generality of the levellers, that, except for the apprehenſion they laboured under of being abandoned by the French, and left wholly to the diſcretion of the oppoſite party, they would have, in many inſtances, publicly expreſſed their abhorrence at ſuch a plan. As ſoon as the French Miſſionaries were fully conſcious of ſuch a diſpoſition in the people, they followed the ſteps of their worthy aſſociate *Grenus*, by continually raiſing freſh ſuſpicions, fomenting hatred and a ſpirit of revenge amongſt the lower claſs, in order to bring them to ſome bloody ſcene, for which they even offered them their aſſiſtance.—In juſtice to Miniſter *Clavière*, we muſt publiſh, that theſe baſe and criminal manœuvres having been denounced to him by the Proviſional Committee of Adminiſtration, he wrote to General *Kellerman*, that he ought to recall thoſe miſſionaries, and keep himſelf within the bounds of moderation and circumſpection towards the Geneveſe.

Note (37), *p.* 52. The perſon who was the moſt forward in quelling this riot, was the very Preſident of the firſt Committee of Safety, appointed by the Inſurgents, M. *Ringler*, a very honeſt, ſenſible, and good-hearted man. This Gentleman muſt have ſeverely repented his having enrolled himſelf in a party, of which he appeared one of the chief leaders, though, in fact, the ſucceſs of the ſecret views of thoſe who were the true leaders, could only depend on a foreign influence, no leſs repugnant to his own feelings and principles of attachment to the independence of his country, than to his duty as a citizen. Many inconſiſtencies of that miſtaken Gentleman may be derived from this falſe ſtep; we ſhall confine ourſelves to theſe few: His ſuffering the levellers to propoſe him, on the 26th of December, as *Syndic de la Garde*, contrary to the moſt ancient and ſolemn laws of the Republic; his accepting of the propoſal they

 made,

made, to grant him *for life*, in conſideration *de ſon dévouement & de ſes ſacrifices à la patrie*, the uſual pay annexed to an office, which, by its nature, is only *annual*; his conſenting, after the rejection of theſe abſurd propoſals, to be appointed as *Preſident* of the *Proviſional Committee of Safety*; and ſoon after quitting that delicate but ſuperior ſituation, for the employment of Warden of the general Hoſpital.

Note (38), *p.* 53. At that time, the number of the new citizens had ſucceſſively increaſed to ſuch a degree, by the admiſſion of foreigners and of others, who at firſt did not dare to offer themſelves, that the total number was brought nearly to 5 or 6,000. But ſo generally diſliked were the proceedings of the Inſurgents, that, in this meeting, where no conſtraint was uſed, they could only bring 864 votes in favour of their propoſals. It has been ſaid, however, that ſeveral of the moſt fanatic levellers were averſe to theſe propoſals, and that they concurred in their being rejected, that they might have a pretence to riſe again, and utterly to overthrow the conſtitution. But it appears that hardly two or three hundred of them were of that opinion; which ſhews more and more how much the generality of the Geneveſe are attached to their independence and to the public order, and how unjuſt and unwiſe it would be, on account of theſe inſurrections and ill practices of a handful of men, ſupported by an irreſiſtible foreign power, either to force upon the Geneveſe, or to engage them to accept of any other form of government but a free, liberal, and well regulated one, which they are born to, of which they are worthy, and which is the only one that their ſituation, their manners, and the confined limits of their Republic, can admit.

Note (39), *p.* 56. This new inſurrection of the Geneveſe levellers had been long planned and meditated by *Grenus*; and in this he was no more ſtopped by the fear of ſhedding the blood

of

of his followers, than of thoſe he conſidered as his enemies. In his intention of betraying his country to France, he fancied that by raiſing, while abſent, a warm and bloody conteſt, in which many of his own friends, together with a number of French volunteers, would neceſſarily loſe their lives, he would, without any riſk to himſelf, give a pretence to the French army in the neighbourhood to enter Geneva. Conformably to that baſe plan, he expreſſed himſelf to the levellers in theſe terms: *You acted very fooliſhly, when you forced your enemies to ſubmiſſion; it was not that which I intended for you; but ſome ſharp action, which would have brought matters to an immediate iſſue.* This concurs with what has been already ſaid, to ſhew the wiſdom of thoſe who had preferred to take upon themſelves the blame of a temporary ſubmiſſion to an inconſiderable party, than to have the ſemblance of bravery and courage in the eyes of ſome unthinking people, at the expence of human blood and the independence of their country.

Though, in this point, *Grenus*'s expectations had been a ſecond time diſappointed, General *Kellerman*, whom we do not know how far he had entered into this plot, ſent immediately freſh troops around Geneva, and acquainted the Miniſter at war in Paris of this ſtep, in ſuch a manner, as to perſuade him that the Geneveſe were deſirous to ſee the French enter Geneva.

" I haſten, Citizen Miniſter," (ſaid he, in an extract of his letter of the 30th of December, printed in the *Gazette Nationale de France*, of the 4th of January), " I haſten to inform you, that " the Marechal de Camp *Pourcin*, Commander of Carouge, has " juſt now written to me, that the revolution had taken place in " Geneva the day before yeſterday; he acquaints me that the " tumultuous movements exiſting in that city, make him wiſh " to be reinforced. Another letter, the truth of which *I*

" have

" have reaſon to credit, ſays: "The Geneveſe revolution is com-
" pleted; the citizens of that Republic have expelled the Great
" and Little Councils, and they wait with impatience for the
" moment when they ſhall receive us in their town. They have
" formed ſome Committees; they organize themſelves, and con-
" fide themſelves entirely on us."

The march of the French troops towards Geneva, which coincided with the above letter, became the ſubject of a correſpondence between the *two Proviſional Committees* and the *General*; in which M. *Dumont*, who then acted as Secretary of State in Geneva, very ably engaged thoſe very Committees in the ſtrongeſt declaration of their own, and of their fellow citizens, attachement to the independence of Geneva; and the General himſelf entered into a ſolemn renewal of the promiſe, made by the National Convention of France, on the 21ſt of November, *to reſpect the neutrality and independence of the Republic.*

About the ſame time, the Proviſional Committees having made a proclamation to expel from the city every foreigner who reſided in it without a ſpecial licence from the police, the *French Chargé d'Affaires* wrote to them, nearly in the ſame way as did the *French Miniſter* here on a ſimilar occaſion, and haughtily aſked, *whether the French citizens were to be included in this proclamation?* But through M. *Dumont*'s influence, and the firmneſs of the Committees, he was anſwered in the affirmative, and found no better means to extricate himſelf from the ſcrape in which he had thrown himſelf, by that inconſiderate demand, than by withdrawing his letter.

The effect of this firmneſs and adherence of the two Committees to the independence of the Repubic was ſoon conſpicuous in the minds of the people. General *Kellerman* came, at the end of January laſt, to Geneva, under pretence of giving the Committee

mittee the *fraternal embrace*. The real object, however, of this visit was to sound the real dispositions of the Genevese in regard to their independence. One of his *Aids de Camp* availed himself of this opportunity, to exhort the several clubs of the Genevese insurgents to mistrust their Clergy, to expel their Aristocrats, to meet together in order to constitute a true and regular *Jacobine Club*, and to unite with France. These strange proposals met every where with the reception they deserved. *No revenge! Long live liberty and equality! Long live our dear independence!* were the only shouts of applause given both to the proposals and the proposers. The *General*, seeing this national spirit, took a glass of wine, and toasted *the independence of the Republic*.

Such a complete failure of so many attempts to realize his scheme, did not fail to provoke *Grenus*'s spleen and anger, as it may be seen by an atrocious libel of his, printed in *Gorsas*'s *Courier des Departments* of the 14th of February, in which he calls M. *Dumont* " un *intrigant* dévoué aux Bernois; un *Prêtre* " dans toute la force du mot; un de ceux qui ont osé soutenir " la necessité d'une garnison Suisse dans Genève, qui ont été " les coopérateurs de Mirabeau, & qui sont aujourdhui les " aboyeurs que Pitt soudoye pour prêcher l'anarchie en France, " & faire jouer les ressorts de la contrerevolution; un chef du " Comité de Genève, où l'on fait des recrues pour le Bri- " gand de Turin, & où l'on distribue contre la nation Fran- " çoise des libelles signés de leurs auteurs, & tacitement avoués " du Comité Dumont."

It was at this very time, when M. *Dumont* was so ably and so successfully defending in Geneva the cause of justice and public order against the French, and whilst he was rendering such eminent services to the independence of his country, that a countryman of his was engaged in republishing here some of

Grenus's

Grenus's accuſations againſt him, in order to make him obnoxious to the Britiſh Miniſtry, and to the nation at large as an enemy to public order, and an *object of contempt and public execration!!!!*

Note (40), *p.* 57. A numerous body of legiſlators in an extenſive Republic, neceſſarily divided into a vaſt number of different parts, which, by their ſituation, their population, and the nature of their reſpective produce and induſtry, are almoſt unconnected with each other, and may be ſuppoſed to have either oppoſite views or oppoſite intereſts, is indiſpenſable; particularly when the people at large can have no other ſhare in the legiſlation than by electing their repreſentatives. But in a ſmall commonwealth, compoſed of a ſingle town and a few adjacent villages, the inhabitants of which are perfectly known to each other, and where thoſe, who are qualified to be entruſted with ſuch a work, are neceſſarily very few; where every individual is capable, at any time, of ſupplying them with all the neceſſary information, and where, in ſhort, no law can have force but until they have ſucceſſively been examined, by the different bodies of adminiſtration, elected by the people, and until they have finally been approved of by the majority of the citizens at large, the electing of 120 citizens, for the ſole purpoſe of digeſting laws in public ſittings, is a downright abſurdity; the worſt effect of which, that is felt, is not that of keeping, for a long while, a whole people of manufacturers and artiſts in a ſtate of legiſlative fever and fermentation, with very little probability of attaining the apparently propoſed end.—In France, on a population of 25 millions, the former Conſtitution inſtituted 720 members for the Legiſlative Body; this was only *one* Repreſentative for about *thirty-four* or *thirty-five thouſands*. The new plan reduced this number within a narrower

rower compaſs, by fixing only *one* Repreſentative for every *fifty thouſands*. In Geneva, the levellers, by creating 120 Legiſlators, acted as if the population of the Republic was of *ſix million*, inſtead of only *thirty thouſand*. Had the chief promoters of this idea no further view, but to frame for their country a good ſyſtem of legiſlation, is it likely that they would have ſo obſtinately inſiſted on taking away ſo many perſons from their uſual and neceſſary avocations, to entruſt them with a taſk which could be far more conveniently performed by a few; —that they would have ſettled on them ſuch comparatively large ſalaries, in a country where public offices are almoſt gratuitouſly diſcharged;—that they would have declared admiſſible to an office, which requires ſo much experience, every citizen above the age of one and twenty, when the qualification for an elector even has been conſtantly limited to the age of five and twenty;—that they ſhould have made the ſittings of this Aſſembly *public*, and have given it ſuch a pompous and improper name as that of a *National Aſſembly*, as if in a country, where the whole body of the people meet together, there ſhould be any other National Aſſembly than that of the people at large?

Note (41), *p.* 58. The ordinary revenue of Geneva, deducting a few temporary taxes impoſed to defray certain extraordinary expenſes, has been conſtantly ſomething more than 100,000 crowns, of about the value of 4 ſhillings ſterling each. Many branches of this revenue have been, by an immediate effect of the French Revolution, or through the extreme reduction of the wealth of many citizens dependant on it, either conſiderably diminiſhed in their produce, or completely annihilated. On the other hand, the expenditure has been, by the late critical junctures, encreaſed to an amazing degree. In ſuch circum-

ſtances have the levellers choſen to involve their country into an additional expence, equal to half its ordinary revenue; the effect of which can only be, either to create endleſs diviſions, or to force the citizens to renounce their independence, and to expoſe themſelves to all the dangers, all the miſeries, attending the French revolution!

Note (42), *p.* 61. By the regulations made, when the National Aſſembly was eſtabliſhed, it was ordered that every member ſhould take the oath of preſerving the independence of the Republic;—that the Aſſembly ſhould not be inveſted with any adminiſtrative, executive, or judiciary power;—that they could, in no caſe whatever, vote a decree of accuſation;—and that a ſtrict order ſhould be maintained amongſt thoſe who might be admitted to their ſittings. Hardly had the Aſſembly met for the firſt time, when an infraction of thoſe wiſe reſtrictions was attempted to be made, by a propoſal ſuggeſted, no doubt, by the inſtigation of the French emiſſaries, to ſend deputies to the French, in order to agree upon a treaty of alliance and commerce between the two Republics. But the Aſſembly did not fall into the ſnare; the well-meaning members pleaded its incompetency; and after a long debate, in which many had an occaſion to diſcloſe their opinions, prudence and wiſdom got the better of this inſidious motion.

Note (43), *p.* 77. It is remarkable, that this apparent regard for treaties and for their own declarations, did not extend beyond the time when the French National Aſſembly thought themſelves in ſome danger. No ſooner were they, for a while, delivered of the fear of the Auſtrian and Pruſſian armies, than they began openly to moleſt every neighbouring independent State, however neutral or friendly, and to ſhew in what contempt they held both the general ſyſtem of Europe, and the faith

of

of public treaties. Their imperious conduct towards the Swiſs States, and eſpecially the Canton of Soleure, Geneva, and the Biſhop of Bâle, the oppreſſion of the city of Francfort; the incorporation of Savoy, Nice, and ſeveral parts of Germany and the Netherlands; the levying of a Batavian Legion, which they placed on the borders of Holland; the opening of the Scheldt; the conſtraint made uſe of in the Netherlands in order to force the inhabitants to an implicit admiſſion of French principles as a baſis of the Conſtitution they were to form for themſelves; all theſe accumulated acts, within ſo ſhort a period, incontrovertibly evince how important it is, for every power concerned in keeping up the freedom and the tranquillity of Europe, to oppoſe a ſyſtem, which, if once prevailing, would inevitably leave all the European States at the diſcretion of France alone.

It is not, however, unimportant to add here, that the opening of the Scheldt was ordered by the Executive Council of France alone, without any expreſs deliberation of the National Convention, and even at a time, when the Netherlands had neither been yet united to France, nor expreſſed any wiſh of getting rid of that impediment to their commerce. The National Convention, that body ſo jealous of its pretended prerogatives, never reproached the Miniſters for ſuch an abuſe of power, which had ſuch an immediate tendency towards involving their country in freſh wars, and which, by violating ſolemn treaties, was a notorious infringement both of the rights of legiſlature and of the laws of nations.

This ſingle circumſtance, together with the ſeveral above related facts, will ſhew how far, under the preſent ſtate of affairs in France, it might have been either proper, or merely poſſible, to negociate with that country. A negociation neceſſarily implies ſome degree of confidence both to the perſons one is to ne-

gociate with, and to the ſtate of things under which the object of the negociation is to take place. Here what a reliance can be had, either to perſons or to things, when perſons may at any time be diſavowed? when a decree of accuſation, paſſed in an evening ſitting, and without any proper grounds whatever, may annihilate both the negociator and the negociation? What reliance can be had on a Government where thoſe very men, who were ſeemingly eſtabliſhed for maintaining peace and keeping up the faith of treaties, do violate them, and arrogate to themſelves, over all Europe, that very power of dictating laws, which would have brought death upon them, had they aſſumed it over a ſingle village in France? What reliance can be had on a Government where the Legiſlative Body, whoſe duty it would be to controul and to repreſs ſuch pernicious and arbitrary exertions of power, not only approve of them, but reſerve all their ſeverity for thoſe who profeſs ſome regard for public faith and the rights of independent States; where a treaty, concluded with all the uſual formalities, by a Miniſter inveſted with full powers, and acting conformably to his inſtructions, may, under pretence of *ſimplifying the diplomatical forms*, be ſet aſide *by the order of the day*; where, at laſt, every connection with a foreign State, however ancient and important, may be broken through, in ten minutes time, at the whim of ſome raſh, loquacious individual, aſſiſted by the noiſy and all-powerful mob in the galleries?

Such is, in fact, the real ſituation of France, that there is not to be found in it either a Government or a Conſtitution, or any power whatever, with whom foreign States may form any legal and laſting tranſaction, or even negociate with any regard to themſelves, and any degree of ſafety.

I ſay more, that pretended *Republic*, the acknowledging of which was the firſt law the French rulers intended to impoſe on foreign

foreign powers, that pretended Republic, conſiſtent with their own principles, is not yet in being; for we muſt remember that the firſt act of the National Convention was to declare, that *no Conſtitution could be lawful unleſs it had been approved of by a majority of the votes of the Sovereign People convened in primary aſſemblies.* That people have not yet expreſſed their will. And if we conſider the ſmall number of thoſe who, both in Paris and in the Departments, have taken any ſhare in the ſeveral elections, we will hardly find a ninth part of France, who really approve of this converſion of a temperate Monarchy into a Republic. It is true, that the National Convention has decreed pain of death againſt all thoſe who would contrive, or even ſpeak, either of re-eſtabliſhing the former, or of any ways impairing the latter; but this act of deſpotiſm is a new piece of inconſiſtency, added to many others which have characterized the tranſactions of that Aſſembly; and it only proves that they have no more regard for their own acts than for the people itſelf, whom they were wont to repreſent, and the worſt part of whom, in fact, they only repreſent by their want of forecaſt, their raſhneſs and their indifference for the public welfare, as well as by the tumult and confuſion of their ſittings.

FINIS.

In the Preſs, and ſpeedily will be publiſhed,

RECUEIL

DE

PIECES AUTHENTIQUES

RELATIVES A LA

CONDUITE DES FRANÇOIS

ENVERS

LA REPUBLIQUE DE GENEVE.

5 JA 59